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This study considers the triggers that may cause China to use economic coercion in 
bilateral state disputes. The literature reviewed shows that economic statecraft and 
coercion is a viable policy tool for shaping an opposing state’s behavior and the degree to 
which a state holds an asymmetrical economic advantage influences its ability to wield 
this tool. China’s rising power has made the study and understanding of the conditions 
under which China will utilize economic coercion an imperative as more states become 
vulnerable to it. China has already revealed that it is willing to shape state behavior 
through economic “carrots” and “sticks.” As demonstrated by the case studies explored in 
this thesis, China uses economic coercion to defend its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty and its understanding of the status quo. Where it holds an economically 
asymmetrical advantage, China has targeted specific sectors for coercion as a way to 
signal resolve. As Chinese economic power continues to rise relative to regional 
neighbors and the U.S., the feasibility of using economic coercion also increases, making 
the future employment of economic coercion likely wherever China perceives a threat to 
its interests that is cannot be solved with its increasing military might. 
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 1 
I. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND CHINESE 
ECONOMIC COERCION 
This chapter is intended to introduce the foundations of economic statecraft and 
coercion, look at the current literature that deals with China’s use of it and possible 
causes. The literature review creates five hypotheses for potential triggers to be explored 
in the following chapters. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The economic and military rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 
attracted worldwide attention, prompting conjecture among China-watchers as to how 
this growing power and influence will change the world. The PRC increasingly attempts 
to influence the policies of neighboring states through “carrots” and “sticks,” economic 
measures that use rewards and punishments to elicit desired behavior from a target.1 The 
two elements of economic statecraft are positive sanctions (carrots), such as most-
favored-nation status and foreign direct investment (FDI), and negative sanctions (sticks), 
for example, trade embargoes and increased import inspections.2  
In a bilateral relationship, how much influence one party can wield over the other 
is variable, but clearly the relative economic sizes and level of dependency matter.3 
Negative economic sanctions involve the withholding of gains from a targeted state, 
commonly through embargoes, tariffs, and boycotts.4 Those sanctions escalate to 
coercion when the intention is to dictate the behavior of the state. In Southeast Asia, 
China offers neighboring states the positive sanction of economic assistance, primarily 
infrastructure projects and aid. As a negative sanction, China implemented a rare-earth 
element (REE) export ban following the Sino–Japanese conflict in the Senkaku Islands in 
2010, banned the importation of Philippine bananas after an incident at Scarborough 
                                                 
1 James Reilly, China’s Economic Statecraft: Turning Wealth into Power (Sydney: Lowy Institute for 
International Policy 2013): 30. 
2 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 41–42. 
3 Reilly, China’s Economic Statecraft, 2. 
4 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 35-41. 
 2 
Shoal in 2012, and cancelled high-level meetings after heads of state met with the Dalai 
Lama in Europe in 2010.5 Other examples not covered by this thesis include the 
imposition of additional inspections on salmon from Norway following the awarding of a 
Nobel Peace Prize to the Chinese political dissident Lui Xiaobo and the imposition of 
luxury goods sanctions on North Korea after continued nuclear testing. The Chinese 
exercise the tactics of economic statecraft for political gain, not in retaliation for 
economic grievances. 
This thesis discusses the use of negative economic sanctions generally and 
particularly those that are used coercively by China. Prominent international disputes that 
have featured economic sanctions include the U.S. sanctions against Cuba, beginning in 
1960, the United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iraq from 1991–2002, and the current 
sanctions against North Korea. These actions were meant to signal strong disapproval. 
Economic coercion, by contrast, goes a step further, influencing policy makers as directly 
as possible. This is particularly effective in democracies, where leaders are vulnerable to 
popular pressure and economic fallout may force changes in foreign policy and 
acquiescence to international demands. With economic coercion used to signal resolve in 
political disputes, what are the conditions in which China will use economic coercion in 
conjunction with other methods as a means to shape opposing state behavior? 
Researching the conditions that cause one state to employ economic coercion 
against another has useful implications for U.S. policymakers and business leaders. 
Accordingly, this chapter thesis presents a rationale for studying economic coercion, the 
current literature with respect to China’s behavior, and hypotheses as to why the PRC 
chooses to act coercively by examining three case studies of Chinese coercion and their 
implications. These studies and the application of hypotheses to mini-cases suggest that 
China is apt to use economic coercion when it perceives threats to its territorial 
sovereignty, integrity, or the status quo under which international disputes are currently 
resolved. 
                                                 
5 The Japanese name for the islands is Senkaku, in Chinese they are referred to as Diaoyu, for 
simplicity the name of Senkaku will be used throughout the paper. The international name for the disputed 
reef in the South China Sea is Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines calls it Panatag Shoal and China calls it 
Huangyan Island. For simplicity, the reef will be referred to as Scarborough Shoal. 
 3 
B. WHY STUDY CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCION? 
There are generally two perspectives on the rise of China and its implications 
internationally. First, experts have long argued that China’s increasing integration into 
the international order and multilateral institutions will constrain its behavior.
6
 More 
recently, experts have observed that the PRC is growing increasingly assertive in in the 
region.
7
 China’s influence and ability to leverage carrots and sticks increases as its 
relative economic power increases, creating the conditions necessary for economic 
coercion. Nevertheless, China has used sticks sparingly and deliberately, in the heat of 
some disputes but not others. Economic coercion, as just one tool available to policy 
makers, has been frequently utilized as a means to shape another state’s behavior, so the 
use of it to defend China’s territorial interests is not surprising. The precise triggers that 
determine when China will resort to economic coercion remain unclear. By 
understanding the conditions under which coercion has been employed in the past, we 
may better predict those situations in which it is likely to occur again. As China’s relative 
power increases and the state leaves larger footprints on the international stage, 
understanding the behavior of this economic giant, especially analyzing its intentions and 
motivations, grows more imperative. 
For policy makers outside China, understanding which factors are likely to trigger 
sanctions, embargoes, and ruinous import inspections can help shape policies and actions. 
Knowing what is likely to provoke retaliation can help policy makers avoid crossing the 
line, or at least cross it forewarned. As the gap between the U.S. and Chinese economies 
narrows, it is more likely that China will use economic coercion to signal opposition to 
U.S. political decisions. PRC attempts of regional economic coercion while the U.S. is 
rebalancing to Asia puts the two states at odds, with each attempting to reshape the region 
                                                 
6 Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?” International Security 28. No. 3 (2003): 150; Kai 
He, “China’s Peaceful Rise and Multilateral Institutions: In Search of a Harmonious World,” in 
“Harmonious World” and China’s New Foreign Policy, ed. Sujian Guo and Jean-Marc F. Blanchard 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 78. 
7 Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy: A New and Worrying Trend,” Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, last modified August 6, 2012. http://csis.org/publication/chinas-
coercive-economic-diplomacy-new-and-worrying-trend; Adam Segal, “Chinese Economic Statecraft and 
the Political Economy of Asian Security,” in China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia, ed. 
William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 146. 
 4 
in its interest, making Chinese economic coercion of U.S. concern. Cognizance of 
potential triggers will help policy makers identify those sectors on which coercion is 
likely to fall and prepare their responses. Like policy makers, business leaders must be 
able to prepare for punitive actions. In business, the risk of sanctions and other 
punishments can be particularly severe. Understanding triggers will allow industrial 
leaders to better mitigate risks and protect the global supply chain, which promotes 
stability at the national and international levels. To mitigate the risk of being targeted by 
economic coercion, diversification of raw material suppliers and market locations would 
alleviate some of the precursors and reduce reliance on one state, not only in the case of 
China but with any state holding an asymmetrical advantage in a sector. 
C. HYPOTHESES 
The above literature review provides the foundation upon which the following 
hypotheses are built. Economic coercion as understood in this thesis is founded in 
Baldwin and Hirschman’s works and is informed by the selected texts on China’s core 
interests, economic assertiveness and nationalism. The research question, which the 
hypotheses attempt to answer, was developed after consulting the materials in the 
literature review. The question investigated is under what conditions China feels the need 
to protect its interests and when it can be expected to employ economic coercion to do so. 
The answers inevitably suggest what truly matters to China, by delineating those interests 
over which China is willing to risk its own economic growth, which is a major pillar of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP’s) governing legitimacy. Regardless of 
proclamations by the ministry of foreign affairs as to what is or is not important to China, 
identifying what has historically triggered economic statecraft and might reasonably be 
expected to do so again is key. In deciding when to deploy economic coercion, it is 
doubtless that China juggles many considerations, from the individual preferences of the 
CCP members to long- and short-term background conditions and the relationships 
between China and the target country. To offset this complexity, the cases selected in this 
thesis occurred over the past seven years and involve different adversary states. The 
literature posits several explanations as to why the PRC may resort to economic 
statecraft, particularly to the use of “sticks.” The five hypotheses are explored as potential 
 5 
drivers of coercion. Because any decision to exercise economic statecraft is likely to be 
informed by factors at many levels, including domestic and international concerns, these 
hypotheses are by no means mutually exclusive. The hypotheses could, rather, interact 
with each other to increase the likelihood of economic coercion. For example, the rise in 
nationalism could harden Chinese foreign policy while economic dependency sets the 
conditions for economic coercion. Likewise a challenge to territorial integrity and 
sovereignty could also be a challenge to regime legitimacy depending on the context of 
the dispute. 
1. H1: Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty 
Economic statecraft is more likely to be used in cases of infringement on 
territorial integrity, which China identifies as a core interest.8 The Scarborough Shoal and 
Senkakus incidents are examples. In both cases, the opposing state was backed by the 
United States, making military escalation unlikely; the most powerful weapon China 
could field was therefore economic. Any fear of a proportional response from the target 
may be lessened, first, by China’s position as the second-largest economy in the world, 
and, second, by the China’s usual denial of the use of sanctions in political disputes and 
inevitable attempt to solve the issue diplomatically.9 
2. H2: The Status Quo 
H2 states that economic statecraft is more likely when China perceives that the 
status quo, which has contributed to its prosperity, is being challenged by other state 
actors. China’s understanding of the status quo is based on bilateral and multilateral 
agreements to which it is a signatory and de facto arrangements with neighboring states 
for the mediation of disputes.10 Preservation of the status quo, particularly in territorial 
disputes, for economic progress was heralded by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s and 
                                                 
8 Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Peaceful Development,” 
(September 2011), sec. 3, http://english.gov.cn/official/2011-09/06/content_1941354.htm. 
9 Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 182; Xinhua, 
“Premier Wen’s Speech at Sixth China-EU Business Summit,” October 7, 2010, http://news 
.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/07/c_13545683.htm. 
10 Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” 
Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 551. 
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continues to guide Chinese foreign policy.11 Once again the 2010 Senkakus case is a 
good example. In this arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain by the Japanese, China 
perceived a deviation from the present conduct of Sino–Japanese relations and escalated 
the dispute, possibly causing the subsequent ban on REE exports. 
3. H3: Regime Legitimacy 
H3 states that any oppositional views that reach the international stage and are 
taken as being directed at the CCP or the legitimacy of its regime may precipitate 
economic coercion. Challenges to regime legitimacy are similar to the first hypotheses, 
but differ in that they do not necessarily involve territory. Regime legitimacy can be 
challenged economically or politically as well. Foreign recognition of Chinese dissidents 
is a prominent offense. Regime legitimacy in China has shifted from a historical 
foundation of elitism and class distinctions to an assertion that the CCP has brought 
economic progress to the people, creating a stable social and political system.12 By 
identifying the party as critical to China’s transformation and defense, the CCP can 
condemn any threat to Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity as being a threat to the 
regime. Defending the party’s core interests is therefore not only an enlightened response 
to the lingering shadow of the “century of humiliation,” but is fundamental to the CCP’s 
ability to act as the champion of China. By this characterization, the wielding of 
economic statecraft is justified as one of many defensive tools in PPC’s arsenal. 
4. H4: Chinese Nationalism 
H4 hypothesizes rising nationalism may make the use of economic coercion more 
likely as the CCP experiences internal pressure to respond assertively to international 
incidents. As the Chinese multiply their use of social media, the regime must be more 
responsive to popular sentiment, including animus directed at neighboring states.13 
Economic coercion can result from public pressure to punish other states for their 
                                                 
11 “Set Aside Dispute and Pursue Joint Development,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, accessed August 15, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539 
/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18023.shtml. 
12 Shirk, China, 53–54. 
13 Ibid., 103. 
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offenses. Chinese nationalists are particularly sensitive to perceived slights from Japan, 
and a strong response by the PRC is demanded. Example transgressions are a Japanese 
textbook that glossed over Japanese atrocities in Manchuria, which caused widespread 
protests and a boycott on Japanese goods, requiring the regime to step in 
diplomatically—and the 2010 Senkakus dispute.14 For hypothesis H4 to hold, the identity 
of the opposing state is important. Incidents involving states that are resented and 
provoke a strong nationalistic clamor would receive harsher treatment than would states 
with no history of infringing Chinese interests. China’s economic coercion would start 
out as mild and then increase as public outcry increased, particularly toward states with 
which the Chinese population is most sensitive. Nationalism would have to drive the 
policy response of China. In sum, depending on the offending state, nationalism and 
pressure from the masses would force China’s hand to respond more forcefully on the 
international stage than it might otherwise might done. 
5. H5: Asymmetric Trade Advantages 
Hypothesis H5 states that to use economic coercion to signal resolve, China must 
enjoy an asymmetrical economic advantage over the intended target in one or more 
sectors. Having this advantage, whether overall or in a specific sector, will make 
economic coercion more likely.15 In the 2010 embargo of REE to Japan, China held a 
near monopoly on the raw materials that Japanese industry required. This advantage 
allowed the PRC to exploit for gain a sector dependency in an unrelated dispute. China’s 
monopoly on REE and the lack of other suppliers made economic coercion more costly 
for Japan than for China and allowed China to influence Japanese industrialists and 
possibly create domestic pressure for acceding to Chinese demands vis-à-vis the Senkaku 
Islands. A lopsided relationship with the target makes economic coercion an easier choice 
for the PRC and thus more likely to be deployed. While not be a stand-alone trigger for 
the use of sticks, this asymmetry may encourage targeted sanctions upon certain sectors. 
                                                 
14 Michael Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain 
(New York: Routledge, 2014), 45. 
15 Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1980), 30-31. 
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The three case studies selected assist in the development of the hypotheses by 
introducing different instances, spanning a five-year period, in which China has been 
charged with economic coercion. Two of the cases, the Senkaku Islands and Scarborough 
Shoal case involve disputes over territory while the Dalai Lama case study involves a 
challenge to regime legitimacy, since the states involved do not dispute the territorial 
claim China has to Tibet. The Dalai Lama case study is more of a political challenge than 
a territorial one. All cases include aspects of economic asymmetry, Chinese nationalism, 
and challenges to the status quo. The wide range of targeted states, from neighboring 
Japan and the Philippines, to France and Germany help reduce the chance that China only 
targets one or two states. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
China’s wielding of economic statecraft has stirred much discussion in recent 
years. The literature is mostly agrees that China’s assertiveness is rising and that the PRC 
is using both positive and negative aspects of economic statecraft more often, with 
negative sanctions being the primary focus of discussion. Generally, a perceived need to 
defend the PRC’s core interests is discussed as a potential trigger for sticks, with the 
CCP’s increased responsiveness to popular nationalistic groundswells also key. 
1. Economic Statecraft 
The work of David A. Baldwin provides a framework for the concepts explored in 
this thesis. Baldwin defines economic statecraft as one government’s attempt to influence 
another through the use of market mechanisms and resources.
16
 As one aspect of 
economic statecraft, economic coercion is the attempt to compel another state to conform 
to actions considered preferable by the initiating state. By contrast, positive economic 
statecraft may employ incentives such as a favorable trade status, subsidies, or the 
relaxation of tariffs.
17
 Baldwin cites five methods of economic coercion, four of which 
involve both punishment and reward, whether threatened or actually implemented. The 
last of these methods is the promulgation of misinformation in an effort to cause a target 
                                                 
16 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 30. 
17 Ibid., 42. 
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state to miscalculate the costs and benefits of its actions.
18
 Constraining the choice of 
options available to a target through positive or negative manipulation is an important 
part of coercion.
19 
Examples of these types of coercive mechanisms are the use of 
sanctions and embargoes (negative), or the use of aid and favorable trade policies 
(positive).
20
 By analyzing past instances of economic statecraft, Baldwin makes the case 
for the exploitation of asymmetrical power as an essential component of economic 
coercion and asserts that, from the perspective of the stronger state, it is easier to 
influence a weaker neighboring state. Thus economic statecraft is just one more weapon 
in state-to-state power plays.
21
 Decrying the tendency to generalize about the success of 
economic statecraft, Baldwin notes that tactics are often subtle and take different paths to 
signal resolve to the opposing state.
22
 
Albert Hirschman also emphasizes the role of asymmetrical trade relations by 
arguing that states seeking influence over neighboring states can do so through economic 
statecraft. He points out that trade is a key part of a state’s power base, and control over 
trade can lead to an advantageous balance of power:
23
 First, because military might can 
be compounded by economic means, increasing the threat level perceived by the targeted 
state, and second, because trade itself may become a source of power over another state, 
providing options for coercion short of war.
24
 In an asymmetrical relationship, the smaller 
partner depends more heavily on bilateral trade, making disruptions more costly to the 
state. As a result, the larger partner can afford to compel desired behavior by threat or 
enforcement of coercive measures.
25
 The use of economics as an instrument of national 
power has been known throughout history as an alternative to military force, and in these 
situations both size and sector-specific advantages matter. 
                                                 
18 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, 38. 
19 Ibid., 38. 
20 Ibid., 41–42. 
21 Ibid.,20. 
22 Ibid., 370–371. 
23 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 13. 
24 Ibid., 14–15. 
25 Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 30–31. 
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2. China’s Core Interests 
China’s core interests boil down to five main points: “state sovereignty, national 
security, territorial integrity and national unification, China’s political system established 
by the constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring 
economic and social development.”26 Concerning state sovereignty, after the Chinese 
“century of humiliation,” the period of foreign interference from 1839–1949, it is 
understandable that China would be preoccupied with thwarting further meddling. A 
constant theme in foreign affairs, the imperative of protecting state sovereignty has been 
pushed by China in defense of itself and others since the development of the “five 
principles of peaceful coexistence,” five years after the PRC was established. This trend 
continues with PRC rhetoric about the rise of the modern Chinese state and its ability to 
ascend peacefully. Second, national security is a concern for any state, and especially for 
one that has faced off against major world powers within the last century. The third 
Chinese core interest is territorial integrity and reunification. The latter clearly refers to 
Taiwan as the main issue, but also applies to the ownership of small islands claimed in 
defiance of Japan, Vietnam, South Korea, and the Philippines. The PRC asserts that not 
until Taiwan and the disputed islands are returned will China regain its territorial 
integrity. Fourth, social stability and the maintenance of CCP power are of utmost 
concern. China’s vaunted rise is the principal pillar of CCP legitimacy, one that could 
crumble in an economic downturn. In such an event, the responsibility for maintaining 
social order and regime stability would fall squarely on the regime’s shoulders as the 
defender of China against exploitation from other powers. Social instability would 
threaten the party enough that it might turn to aggressive behavior domestically and 
abroad. Finally, the fifth core interest of the Chinese is a stable environment in which to 
achieve further economic and social progress. China’s population has become more 
affluent, and the PRC is providing better for the citizenry. Cracks in the social order 
could undermine this progress. The iron thread connecting these interests is a 
combination of maintaining the status quo internationally and resolving outstanding 
issues in a manner favorable to China without delegitimizing the party. 
                                                 
26 Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Peaceful Development.” 
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On the international stage, the PRC is intractable in defense of its core interests—
Taiwan is a good example of how Chinese reunification and territorial integrity must not 
be questioned. Taiwan has been a sticking point between the U.S. and the PRC since the 
normalizing of relations in 1972. The Taiwan issue also involves the Chinese core 
interests of social stability and regime furtherance. Were Taiwan to declare independence 
from the mainland, the PRC would feel immense domestic pressure to react, or be forced 
from power.
27
 The PRC is thus unwilling to consider any outcome other than 
reunification. China has taken economic and military action to quash pro-independence 
actors in Taiwan, as in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Straits crisis and the PRC response to the 
election of Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian in 2000.
28
 China’s insistence on 
reunification leaves the PRC unwilling to negotiate Taiwan’s future and unwilling to state 
publicly that reunification will not occur without the use of force. 
3. Chinese Economic Assertiveness 
The rise of an economically strong China is exacerbating tensions across the 
region. Bonnie Glaser points to potential flashpoints in the region and provides a 
thorough historical background of the security challenges China faces.
29
 She identifies 
issues that could encroach on China’s stable relationships with the U.S., Japan, Mongolia, 
Korea, Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and India. The push for economic growth is a 
moderating factor on China’s foreign policy, but in the meantime, China will continue to 
increase military power and assert its territorial claims.
30
 With so many potential areas of 
conflict in the region, a Chinese military that is still catching up to the West, and an array 
of world powers with vested interests in Asia, China may increasingly use economic 
statecraft to avoid military entanglements. Glaser looks at the growing use of sticks and 
carrots in the PRC and argues that China is shaping Southeast Asian national policies 
through aid and coercion.
31
 A recent example is the Scarborough Shoal affair, in which 
                                                 
27 Shirk, China, 182. 
28 Ibid., 188–195. 
29 Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Security Perceptions,” Asian Survey 33, no. 3 (March 1993): 253. 
30 Ibid., 270–271. 
31 Glaser, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy: A New and Worrying Trend.” 
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Chinese punitive measures prompted Philippine business leaders urge capitulation, the 
embargo of REE to Japan in the Senkaku Islands dispute, and China’s more stringent 
inspections of Norwegian salmon after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to 
political dissident Liu Xiaobo.
32
  
James Reilly agrees with Glaser that China is increasingly assertive, but argues 
that China’s economic statecraft is not necessarily punitive in all cases and that China 
appears to prefer using carrots to persuade neighboring states.
33
 In most cases of 
economic enticement, aid or loans are given to improve the infrastructure of a smaller 
state. These carrots have been more successful for China than sticks, with the sticks 
proving mostly ineffective and costly, particularly in maritime disputes.
34
 
Acknowledging the REE embargo, Scarborough Shoal, and the suspension of an Airbus 
contract after a meeting between the Dalai Lama and French president Nicolas Sarkozy,
35
 
Reilly nevertheless asserts that that while a mixture of statecraft tactics will continue, 
carrots are the first weapon of choice for China and sticks are applied only as needed. 
China uses its growing economic strength in ways that have raised suspicions 
among neighboring states and potential adversaries. Its rise in wealth is funding a military 
modernization program, and this growing military strength is being used to influence 
other states.
36
 Adam Segal argues that while other states typically avoid conflict to ensure 
economic stability, China, as the center of the world market, need not subjugate its 
economy to security concerns: China is in a position to pursue both.
37
 By strengthening 
economic ties with the U.S. and Asia, the PRC is increasing its security through 
economic interdependence, making it increasingly costly for any state to turn adversarial. 
This gain in power and influence is making China the largest player in the region—one 
that other states may wish to confer with before making decisions that could jeopardize 
                                                 
32 Glaser, “China’s Economic Coercive Diplomacy.” 
33 Reilly, “China’s Economic Statecraft,” 5. 
34 Ibid., 10. 
35 Ibid., 5–8. 
36 Segal, “Chinese Economic Statecraft and the Political Economy of Asian Security,” 146. 
37 Ibid., 147. 
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relations, thus allowing China a voice in their policy making.
38
 As the perceived need for 
China to weigh in with neighboring states becomes normalized, China may not have to 
continue economic coercion, having the ability to influence neighboring states’ decision 
making processes. This trend is exacerbated by the asymmetry of states that are too small 
to defend themselves against Chinese hegemony.
39
 Robert Ross notes that South Korea 
and Taiwan are now economically dependent on China, making them vulnerable to 
coercion, while Japanese and Philippine dependence on China is limited, rendering them 
less vulnerable.
40
 Counter-intuitively, South Korea and Taiwan’s dependency may not 
necessarily make coercive measures more likely. Disputes between China and dependent 
states may end in threats that never materialize as actions. Extrapolating that logic, 
economic coercion against states that are not conforming to China’s wishes and unlikely 
to bend to threats might be more likely than military action. 
Amitav Acharya argues that China will not revert to being the isolated Middle 
Kingdom of the past, due to its entanglements in international institutions, economic 
interdependency with outsiders, and multiple institutional linkages.
41
 These factors will 
help mitigate a potential security dilemma in the region. As of now, there is no Asian 
bandwagoning with China, and to allow such, the U.S. influence would have to be 
removed.
42
 Extending his argument on the moderating effect of institutions through the 
internalizing of norms, Acharya claims that as China embeds itself further with 
international organizations, it will be constrained from acting outside the norms of those 
institutions—meaning that while China may act aggressively from time to time, these 
instances will become fewer as China becomes more multilateral. 
                                                 
38 Segal, “Chinese Economic Statecraft and the Political Economy of Asian Security,” 153. 
39 Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing 
in East Asia,” in China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia, ed. William W. Keller and Thomas G. 
Rawski (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 122. 
40 Ibid., 130–132. 
41 Acharya, “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?” 150. 
42 Ibid., 155. 
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4. The Role of Nationalism 
Erica Downs and Phillip Saunders foresee China’s negative economic actions as 
more limited in the future due to nationalism, which is currently checked by the 
economic aspirations of the regime, diminishing the role public sentiment plays in 
foreign and economic relations.
43
 Concerns about China’s aggressiveness are overblown 
according to these experts, because China is already cooperating within the system.
44
 
Since their writings in 1998, China has continued to become more involved 
internationally and, therefore, would have less incentive to respond to domestic 
nationalism. Michael Yahuda agrees that China is more worried about sustaining 
economic growth in order to quell domestic problems than about encroaching on 
neighboring states. Yahuda asserts that China seeks peaceful resolutions to neighborhood 
conflicts, with better relations and minimized fears,
45
 and that the real challenge China 
faces is not international, but domestic.
46
 Relying on economics and nationalist fervor for 
its legitimacy, the PRC may be hesitant to undermine its standing by instigating conflicts 
over territory and markets. 
Susan Shirk departs from Downs and Saunders, stressing that increases in 
nationalism and domestic unrest can cause the state to act more assertively in the 
international system. To maintain global stability, the leaders of the PRC need to check 
domestic pressures that may push them into taking negative steps toward states like 
Japan, against whose perceived slights the public is highly reactive.
47
 Extending this 
argument, China might not have used economic statecraft against Japan in 2010 if the 
people had not protested and forced the CCP’s hand. 
Peter Gries touches on China’s diplomatic relationship with Japan and how, due 
to the Internet, the expression of popular political opinion is thriving, particularly when it 
                                                 
43 Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Suanders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism,” 
International Security 23, no. 2 (Winter 1998–1999): 144. 
44 Ibid., 116. 
45 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 2nd ed. (New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 283. 
46 Ibid., 310. 
47 Shirk, China, 85. 
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comes to airing grievances against Japan. Rising nationalism and enmity is causing fervor 
reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution.
48
 While this nationalism feeds the short-term 
goals of the government, there is a long-term risk that massive unrest could turn against 
the CCP.
49
 Heated nationalism limits China’s ability to conduct foreign affairs 
pragmatically and arouses fear in Japan. Yahuda outlines the relationships in the region, 
focusing mainly on Sino–Japanese relations, but also touching on Chinese relations with 
the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. Like Shirk, Yahuda 
notes that while the Chinese exude self-confidence on the international stage, they are 
quite vulnerable at home, which affects their foreign policy.
50
 Explicitly detailing the 
Senkaku Island dispute, he also analyzes the Dalai Lama contretemps
51
 and argues that 
the Chinese tend to tie economic relations directly to how harmonious the diplomatic 
arena is in dyadic relationships, with economic disputes often infringing on diplomacy.
52
 
Yahuda suggests, meanwhile, that the Senkakus dispute did not have a lasting effect on 
Sino–Japanese relations.53 In its relations within ASEAN, China is using multilateral 
institutions to attach neighboring states to itself economically, ensuring that they cannot 
challenge its territorial integrity without incurring costs.
54
 Despite this, China is 




With domestic challenges being a paramount concern for the CCP, the rise in 
nationalism could increase popular demand that the regime to respond to public opinion. 
As responsiveness increases and the public becomes more involved in decisions, the 
                                                 
48 Peter Gries, “China’s ‘New Thinking’ on Japan,” The China Quarterly, no 184 (December 2005): 
847. 
49 Ibid., 846. 
50 Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War, 39; Shirk, China, 10. 
51 Yahuda, Sino-Japanese Relations after the Cold War, 55. 
52 Ibid., 77. 
53 Ibid., 78. 
54 Ibid., 83. 
55 Ibid., 89. 
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choices available to decision makers becomes narrower, potentially hardening their 
stance toward opposing states and possibly leading to an increase in economic statecraft. 
E. ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses comparative case studies to identify potential triggers that drive 
the use of economic coercion by the Chinese. The hypotheses presented suggest that 
these triggers may stem from territorial infringement, threats to the status quo and the 
political regime, nationalism, and economic dependency. This thesis examines three 
major cases in which China used economic coercion against other countries: the 2010 
conflict over the Senkaku Islands with Japan, the 2012 dispute over Scarborough Shoal 
with the Philippines, and the visits of the Dalai Lama to Germany in 2007 and France in 
2008. Three mini-cases that receive more cursory treatment in the final chapter are recent 
developments in the Senkaku Islands, the Second Thomas Shoal controversy in the 
Philippines, the positioning of oil rig HD-981 near Vietnam in 2014, and the meetings of 
the Dalai Lama with Prime Minister David Cameron in 2012 and President Obama in 
2014. 
To analyze economic coercion in these cased, the first step is to discover common 
conditions. The case studies are structured so as to look only at China and the target state 
involved. Because selecting on the dependent variable can introduce issues of narrowed 
research scope, the cases selected should help discover those conditions that have 
triggered China’s use of coercion. A definitive survey of all instances in which the 
conditions for economic coercion were present and were or were not utilized is outside 
the scope of this thesis and is suggested for further study. The selection of cases in which 
economic coercion is alleged, considered without the analyzing contrasting case studies, 
may introduce bias that might inflate the results. A longer study might remove much of 
this bias through a more thorough examination of cases in which China refrained from 
using economic coercion under similar circumstances. While this approach does not yield 
definitive numerical data to predict relative likelihood, trends are shown that indicate 
those conditions in which economic statecraft is more likely to be used. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The main problem or question addressed throughout these case studies is whether 
there is a handful of disputes or policies that China perceives important enough that 
economic statecraft must be invoked—in other words, issues so vital that the will of 
China must be enforced and other states must be coerced. The findings of the study 
suggest that economic coercion is more likely in cases where China perceives that its 
territorial integrity and sovereignty (H1) and the status quo (H2) are being challenged.H3, 
regime legitimacy, is only partially supported in the Dalai Lama case, through the 
assumption that undermining CCP rule in Tibet could challenge the regime. Asymmetric 
trade dependency appears to be a precursor to the use of economic coercion, and not 
necessarily a trigger. The use of sector specific sanctions, which were utilized in the 
Senkaku Islands and Scarborough Shoal disputes, require an asymmetric relationship in 
favor of China, but the dispute appears to be the trigger, not trade dependency. The rise 
of nationalism (H4) does play a small role in China’s foreign policy, but like H5, the 
research suggest that it is a secondary condition and does not make economic coercion 
more likely. 
The organization of the remaining thesis is setup to present the case studies, 
summarize and test the findings, and discuss possible implications. Chapter II contains 
the first case to be analyzed, the 2010 Senkaku Islands affair and the retaliatory REE 
clampdown. Chapter III analyzes, the 2012 dispute over Scarborough Shoal and punitive 
measures against the Philippines. Chapter IV investigates the PRC reaction to meetings 
between the Dalai Lama and Western leaders in 2007 and 2008. Employing the analysis 
gleaned from the case studies, this thesis proposes a list of interests that China will 
defend with economic statecraft. In conclusion, the hypotheses of this research are tested 
against historical data and applied to recent cases for assessment, implications for the 
U.S. Department of State and U.S. Navy are analyzed, research findings are summarized, 
and recommendations are made for further research.  
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II. THE SENKAKUS INCIDENT, 2010 
The first case study to be explored, China has been accused of using economic 
coercion against Japan over a territorial dispute in the Senkaku Islands in 2010. Chapter 
II explores the origins of the dispute, the incidents that occurred and which hypotheses 
appear to be supported by this case study. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On September 7, 2010, the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179 collided with 
two Japanese coast guard (JCG) vessels near the Senkaku Islands (see Figure 1). The 
vessel and crew were quickly taken into custody by Japanese authorities and the captain 
was charged under Japanese law, as outlined in Section D of this chapter. For Japan, 
damage to coast-guard vessels in an area under Japanese administrative control was 
serious enough to elicit filing of charges. From China’s perspective, Japan violated the 
status-quo procedure of turning over the captain and crew to the Chinese, which has been 
set by a series of agreements in the preceding 15 years. Both parties have an interest in 
the economic exploitation of the area, both for its fisheries and energy resources, and a 
common understanding that escalation in the area could threaten interests on either side. 
Complicating the diplomacy was the fact that China’s ascendant economic power has 
shifted the balance of power in the region.  
In 2010, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economy, second 
only to the U.S.
56
 China’s advance has had two dramatic impacts on foreign relations 
within the region. First, China has become a dominant economic player that is able to 
impose high costs on targeted states by applying coercion in bilateral disputes—and it is 
becoming more aggressive in doing so.
57
 Second, China has invested in a modernized 
military that is able to back up its use of economic statecraft. In the Senkakus dispute, in 
which territorial integrity was challenged and China chose not to retaliate militarily or 
                                                 
56 Chester Dawson and Jason Dean, “Rising China Bests a Shrinking Japan,” Wall Street Journal, 
February 14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles 
/SB10001424052748704593604576140912411499184. 
57 Reilly, China’s Economic Statecraft: Turning Wealth into Power, 2. 
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diplomatically (due to the U.S. protections), the PRC resorted to economic coercion to 
force a desired behavior. China exploited Japanese dependencies within a key economic 
sector by cutting off the supply of rare-earth elements (REE) needed by Japanese 
industry. China also used law-enforcement vessels to secure its interests in the disputed 
territory. 
In Sino–Japanese relations, the change in relative power has been stark and swift, 
as seen in those sectors where China holds the lion’s share of a natural resources such as 
the REEs needed by Japan for higher value-added goods production. China’s control over 
the REE market climbed from 27 percent of the world’s supply in 1990 to 90 percent in 
2008.
58
 Diplomatically, Sino–Japanese relations were improving until 2005, when the 
relationship began to slip due to several incidents, including the 2010 Senkakus dispute. 
Japan’s perceived affront to China’s territorial integrity resulted in a sector-specific 
asymmetrical relationship’s being used as a weapon; lacking alternative means of 
enforcement, China deployed economic coercion. 
Examination of the Senkakus case study suggests that the first hypothesis, H1, is 
supported: China uses economic statecraft when territorial integrity and sovereignty are 
challenged. The second hypothesis, H2, stating that attempts to change the status quo 
become triggers, is also supported; however, the third hypothesis, H3, stating that 
challenges to regime legitimacy are triggers, is not and H4, that nationalist behavior leads 
to limited diplomacy, is partially supported. Nationalism may have led to the continuation 
of the ban after the release of the entirety of the fishing boat crew. Finally, H5, that China 
uses economic coercion where it has an asymmetrical advantage, is supported. 
This chapter discusses China and Japan’s claims to the Senkaku Islands, looks at 
the state of their economic and diplomatic relations before the dispute, lays out key 
events, and finishes with a discussion of how the incident was viewed by each state and 
the coercion used by the Chinese to signal resolve in the matter. 
                                                 
58 Tse Pui-Kwan, “China’s Rare-earth Industry,” U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 1042 
(2011): 2, http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2011/1042/of2011-1042.pdf. 
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Figure 1.  The Senkaku Islands59 
B. CLAIMS ON SENKAKU ISLANDS 
Both China and Japan claim the Senkaku Islands, and Japan currently administers 
them. Japan asserts that it found the islands uninhabited in 1885 and incorporated them in 
1895.60 China claims records of the islands from 1403 and having used the islands for 
coastal defense since 1561.61 
1. Japanese Claims 
The dispute over the Senkaku Islands began at the end of World War II, with 
China insisting that the islands belonged among territories taken after the Sino-Japanese 
war of 1895 and that they should be returned in accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam 
                                                 
59 “Japan Deports Pro-China Activists,” Al Jazeera, August 18, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news 
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60 “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
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61 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Diaoyu Dao, An 
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declarations. Japan states simply that no dispute exists—that in 1885, the government 
conducted a survey of the uninhabited islands and found no trace that they had ever been 
occupied. Japan claimed the islands through a cabinet decision in 1895, during the Sino-
Japanese War, erected markers on them, and occupied them for the next 45 years. The 
islands were not ceded by China in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-
Japanese War; the accession was done separately, through the cabinet decision. In 
addition, Japan points out that the islands were not included in the territories it renounced 
in the 1951 San Francisco Treaty at the end of World War II.
62
 This treaty stated that the 
Japanese “renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores,” and that 
the United States would act as an administer to the islands “south of 29° north latitude 
(including the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands).”63 Japan argues that the island are not a 
part of the Formosa–Pescadores island groupings and, as a result, were rightly 
administered by the U.S. before being turned over to Japanese administration under the 
Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu 
Islands and the Daito Islands in 1972.
64
 Therefore, based on the principle of terra nullius, 
the Japanese claim that a territorial dispute does not exist. The islands were not taken in 
the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and they have been Japanese since their discovery in 1885 
and claim by cabinet decision in 1895. 
2. Chinese Claims 
China’s insistence on its territorial claim over the islands and subsequent use of 
economic coercion to defend them supports hypothesis H1. China claims that the earliest 
records of the Senkaku Islands under their current Chinese name, Diaoyu, appeared in 
1403, when the king of the Ryukyu Islands started paying tribute to the Ming dynasty and 
both the Ming and Qing dynasties sent envoys to the Ryukyus, passing by the Senkaku 
Islands and recording their presence. In 1650, the islands were recorded as Chinese 
territory in the Annals of Chong-shan, which stated that everything east of Chiwei Yu 
                                                 
62 “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands.” 
63 Treaty of Peace with Japan (with Two Declarations), San Francisco, September 8, 1951, United 
Nations Treaty Series, No. 1832, 48–50. 
64 “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands.”  
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belonged to the Ryukyu chain and everything west belonged to China. Administratively, 
China began jurisdiction of the islands in 1561, under the Ming, by incorporating the 
Senkakus into the Chinese coastal-defense system. From that point on, until the Japanese 
claimed it in the Sino-Japanese War, the islands were administered by China.
65
 The 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese War, stated that China 
surrendered all islands pertaining to the island of Formosa.
66
 China considers the 
Senkaku Islands among those islands that were taken over by Japan under the treaty.
67
 
Citing the Potsdam Declaration, which reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration, China claims 
that after World War II, the islands should have once again been administered by China. 
The Cairo Declaration states, “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such 
as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. 
Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and 
greed.”68 The Potsdam Declaration later maintained this view, stating, “The terms of the 
Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the 
islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we 
determine.”69 The Chinese claim is based on the belief that the islands were seized by 
Japanese aggressors during the Sino-Japanese War and that the transfer of administration 
from the U.S. to Japan is invalid, since the islands should have been returned following 
World War II, consequent to their affiliation with Taiwan.
70
  
3. The Importance of the Senkaku Islands 
Further complicating the dispute are oil deposits, which were found in the 1960s 
during a geological survey by the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
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 Oil reserves in the East China Sea are estimated at 60–100 million barrels, with 1–
2 trillion cubic feet of natural-gas deposits, making the area important for the second- and 
third-largest oil importers, China and Japan, respectively.
72
 While not a large find in 
terms of global production, these oil deposits would bring proven Japanese reserves from 
44.1 million (as estimated in 2013) to 104.1 million barrels (adding the low end of the 
estimate)—more than doubling Japan’s oil in reserve.73 Likewise, Japanese natural-gas 
reserves would increase from .738 trillion cubic feet to 1.738 trillion, nearly doubling the 
reserve.
74
 China, by contrast, would not increase its reserves so drastically, as it already 
has proven oil reserves, to the extent of 23.7 billion barrels, and natural gas reserves of 
141.2 trillion cubic feet in 2013.
75
 These figures suggest that the oil deposits would make 
a larger difference to Japan than China, but both states are concerned with the allocation 
of energy resources in the future. In addition to oil and natural gas, the East China Sea is 
also home to abundant sea life, making access to its fishing grounds important. 
Strategically, the East China Sea contains a series of important sea-lanes to China, Korea, 
and Japan, whose control and protection is vital to surrounding economies. Both states 
have instructed their populations that they have sovereignty over the islands, 
complicating the chances of negotiation on either side. Japan writes its unqualified claims 
into textbooks, and China is looking at revisiting classical texts to prove its case.
76
 
Clearly, both China and Japan have nationalistic sentiments and economic concerns 
invested in the islands. 
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C. SINO-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS  
Diplomatic relations between China and Japan improved from 1972 through 
2005. In 2005, diplomatic relations took a hit due to several events that increased friction; 
economically, however, relations have improved steadily, despite the downturn in 
diplomacy. 
1. Diplomatic Relations 
Following U.S. and PRC rapprochement and the release of the Shanghai 
Communiqué, Japan recognized the PRC in 1972, one of the first states to do so, despite 
mostly negative interactions over the previous century. From 1972–2005, relations 
continued to improve, with both economies growing through most of the period due to 
many areas to mutual cooperation.
77
 However, as China began the second phase of its 
military modernization program in the 1990s, tensions began to rise. Chinese 
modernization, aimed at accomplishing the PRC’s second core interest of national 
security, aroused concerns in Tokyo as to motivations.
78
 China’s growing military might, 




While the security situation was causing apprehension, diplomatically, tensions 
reached fever pitch in 2005, with former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, which memorializes Japan’s military casualties—including some war 
criminals; the release of a new textbook that glossed over Japanese atrocities in World 
War II, most outrageously those committed in China; and Japan’s attempt to become a 
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.
80
 These events put domestic pressure 
on the CCP to retort in a meaningful and unyielding way. With protests and riots 
ongoing, the two states could no longer cooperate as before, and Japanese aid to China 
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 After the turmoil subsided and Abe Shinzo took over as prime minister in 
2006, relations began to recover, partly due to Abe’s promises not to visit the Yasukuni 
Shrine or support Taiwanese independence.
82
 Abe’s successor, Yasuo Fukuda, continued 
to mend relations with China, promoting a joint-development agreement for the East 
China Sea in 2008.
83
 Intended to increased cooperation, the agreement was not carried 
through to completion. 
Despite the efforts of Abe and Fukuda, both of whom were Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) members, and attempts to warm relations between the neighboring states, 
issues remained. In 2007, Abe announced that he intended to create an “arc of freedom” 
that excluded China and that Beijing interpreted as an insult.
84
 Second, Japan and China 
remained divided over the disputed islands in the East China Sea and could not reach a 
settlement despite a 2008 joint-development agreement. Third, a shipment of poisoned 
dumplings from China to Japan in 2008 brought no meaningful apology from China.
85
 
These ongoing conflicts continued to divide the two governments before the dispute of 
2010. 
In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took over the diet and elected 
Yukio Hatoyama as prime minister. Hatoyama pushed for closer cooperation between the 
two states, called for a “sea of fraternity” within Asia, and advocated the installation of a 
hotline with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao to help with diplomatic issues.
86
 The Senkaku 
Islands incident occurred a few months later, and regrettably the hotline appeared to have 
little effect in solving the issue diplomatically. Some of the lack of cooperation over the 
Senkaku Islands has been attributed to the DPJ’s ignorance of a “secret deal” with the 
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LDP on the handling of Chinese citizens in the vicinity of the islands.
87
 The agreement 
backed up the 1997 China–Japan Fisheries Agreement in which both states agreed to 
handle vessels according to the rules of the flagged state, and under the deal, Japan 
allegedly agreed to send Chinese citizens back to China.
88
 At the time of the incident, 
Naoto Kan, a member of the DPJ, had succeeded Hatoyama as prime minister but was 
apparently unaware of the arrangement. Kan remained in power until a year after the 
Senkakus events. China’s reaction to the breaking of the deal and the fisheries agreement 
supports the second hypothesis of this research, H2. 
2. Economic Relations 
Economic interdependence between Japan and China increased as China opened 
up to the world and began its climb. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) prior to Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reforms was growing at 6.0 percent; once the reforms were enacted, 
the GDP growth shot to an average of 9.6 percent.
89
 Regionally, China’s rise translated 
into increasingly dependency on China for resources and as a market for exported goods, 
to include the Japanese economy.
90 
Japan initially grew in a similar fashion following 
World War II, becoming the first Asian miracle, but began to stagnate in the 1990s. In 
1990, trade between Japan and China was at $18.2 billion, eventually reaching $267.0 
billion in 2005 (see Table 1)91. In addition, Japanese investment in China increased to 20 
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Table 1.   Sino-Japanese trade in billions of USD93 
 
 
The Japanese economy had already moved past the exportation of raw materials 
to the production of higher value-added goods such as electronics. Crucial to the creation 
of these goods was steady access to the rare-earth elements used in computers, hybrid-car 
batteries, and wind turbines.
94
 China’s production of REEs increased greatly over the past 
quarter century: production went from 16,000 metric tons in 1990 to 129,000 metric tons 
in 2009.95 What is critical is that world production levels were at 132,000 metric tons in 
2009, meaning that outside of China, only 3,000 metric tons of REE were produced.
96 
At 
the time of the 2010 incident, China held 90 percent of the global REE supply
97
 and 
Japan relied on China to provide 80–90 percent of its REEs (see Table 2).98 Japanese 
                                                 
93 “Trade Statistics of Japan,” Ministry of Finance. 
94 Lee Levkowitz, “China’s Rare Earths Industry and its Role in the International Market,” U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Backgrounder, November 3, 2010, http://www.uscc.gov 
/Research/china%E2%80%99s-rare-earths-industry-and-its-role-international-market  
95 Pui-Kwan, “China’s Rare-earth Industry,” 2 
96 Ibid. 
97 Elliot Brennan, “The Next Oil? Rare Earth Metals,” The Diplomat, January 10, 2013, 
http://thediplomat .com /2013/01/the-new-prize-china-and-indias-rare-earth-scramble. 
98 Hiroko Tabuchi, “The Hunt for Rare Earths,” The New York Times, November 25, 2010. 
 29 
reliance on REE imports (commodity codes 2846, 280530, and 360690) from China 
averaged 86 percent of its total REE imports from 2000–2009.99 Owing to the embargo, 
imports dropped slightly in 2010 to 80 percent of all REEs imported.100 Once Japan 
began to pursue other resources domestically and abroad, its sector vulnerability 
decreased, averaging 61 percent of all imports coming from China from 2011–2013.101 
While China was not the only source of REE, it held a virtual monopoly, leaving not only 
Japan, but advanced industrial nations around the globe reliant on the stability of these 
imports. The economic relationship and trade between the two countries, which might 
have stabilized the relationship before to the downturn in foreign relations in 2005, did 
little to prevent confrontation.  
Table 2.   Japanese REE Commodity Imports (Commodity Codes 2846, 
280530, 360690) in Hundreds of Metric Tons102 
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D. THE 2010 SENKAKUS INCIDENT  
On September 7, 2010, the Chinese fishing trawler Minjinyu 5179, captained by 
Zhan Qixiong, was operating approximately 7.45 miles off the Senkaku Islands when it 
was spotted by a JCG vessel.103 The JCG consists of 120 patrol vessels and is overseen 
by the Japanese ministry of land, infrastructure, transportation and tourism.104 Upon the 
JCG’s intercepting the vessel and demanding to board, the Minjinyu 5179 collided with a 
JCG Hateruma-class vessel, the Yonakuni, and attempted to flee. The Yonakuni gave 
chase, and during the pursuit another JCG patrol vessel, the Mizuki, joined; the Minjinyu 
5179 then collided with the Mizuki, less than an hour after the first collision. Stopping the 
trawler at that point, the JCG boarded and arrested Zhan and 14 crewmembers. A few 
hours later, Zhan was charged with “obstruction of official duties” and “illegal 
fishing.”105 Upon his release on September 24, 2010, the PRC protested and Japan 
responded by stating that it was handling a domestic issue according to domestic law. 
Chinese foreign-ministry (CMF) spokesperson Jiang Yu was quoted as calling the 
behavior of Japanese authorities “absurd, illegal, and invalid.”106 Shortly after the arrest 
of Zhan, Jiang stated that the Chinese government “demand Japanese patrol boats refrain 
from so-called law-enforcement activities in waters off the Diaoyu islands and actions 
that would threaten the safety of Chinese fishing boats and their crew.”107 China saw the 
arrest and charging of Zhan as a violation of the tacit agreement to release and return 
prisoners and as a defiance of the 1997 fisheries agreement. In China’s eyes, a 
provocation had occurred and Chinese interests had been challenged. According to Lin 
Xiaoguang, a professor at the CCP Central Committee Party School, “the Japanese side 
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has ignored the goodwill of the Chinese side and quietly played many little tricks on the 
Diaoyu [Senkaku] Island issue.”108 Over the next several days, the PRC summoned the 
Japanese ambassador, Niwa Uichiro, for discussions on the matter, and on September 12 
demanded the release of the crew and boat. Japan responded by refusing to acknowledge 
the existence of a territorial dispute and confirming that it would continue to administer 
the islands. Japanese chief-cabinet-secretary Yoshito Sengoku stated two days after the 
event that “no special diplomatic consideration was given. Procedures were carried out in 
an orderly manner. The matter was handled according to domestic Japanese law because 
Japan’s position has always been that no territorial issue exists over the Senkaku 
Islands.”109 
Nevertheless, on September 13, the 14crewmembers and the Minjinyu 5179 were 
released. Zhan remained in custody until September 24. The PRC immediately demanded 
reparations and an apology for the unlawful detention of a Chinese citizen, which was 
rejected by Tokyo. CMF spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated, “If Japan takes its ties with 
China seriously, Japan should take practical measures to remove the negative effects of 
the incident and mend bilateral relations.”110 In return, Japan wanted China to pay for 
damages to the JCG vessels.
111
 
Immediately following the incident, China suspended all intergovernmental 
meetings and negotiations, including talks on joint exploration of the Chunxiao gas fields, 
and reduced Chinese tourism to Japan. Most official and unofficial exchanges between 
the two states were cancelled.
112
 Most notably, from September 23 to November 19 the 
PRC suspended the shipment of REEs to Japan, drying up the supply of raw materials for 
Japanese industry,
113
 though China denied the suspension. At the 6th China-EU Business 
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Summit on October, 6, 2010, Wen Jiabao stated, “We haven’t imposed, and will not, 
impose an embargo on the industry…. China is not using rare earth as a bargaining 
chip.”114 However, in the eight months before to the suspension, Chinese exports of REE 
averaged around 1,780 metric tons per month.115 In September, the numbers remained 
high due to the late imposition of the embargo, but in October and November, REE 




China’s actions were labeled by Japan and the media as aggressive and 
nationalistic, feeding a growing apprehension about China’s rise.117 The Japanese foreign 
minister, Katsuya Okada, felt that the incident was being characterized in Chinese media 
as a deliberate provocation by Japan, thus complicating the negotiations. Stating that 
“such reports are not true and extremely regrettable,” Okada urged China to proceed 
“calmly and carefully.”118 In the Yomiuri Shimbun, an October 6 article described the 
Japanese perception of China’s approach: “China’s hard-nosed diplomacy gave the 
impression to the international community that the country is aggressive.”119 An editorial 
in the Asahi Shimbun stated, “China is far from a ‘sensible major power’ that respects the 
rules shared by the international community,” and quoted an unnamed senior official in 
the Japanese ministry of foreign affairs as stating, “China practiced diplomacy in a rude 
manner by pushing demands with force.”120 Japan saw the China’s reaction as an 
overreaction, since, in its view, Japan was upholding the rightful application of law in the 
Senkakus. 
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While both sides experienced public outcry, protests were far more prevalent in 
China. In October, in response to a planned Japanese protest outside the Chinese embassy 
in Tokyo, thousands of Chinese college students marched to show their outrage: Xinhua 
reported 2,000 in Chengdu, 7,000 in Xi’an, and an additional protest in Zhengzhou with 
an unreported number of students. The protesters shouted slogans such as “defend the 
Diaoyu Islands,” and “fight Japan,” burned Japanese flags, and vandalized a Japanese 
shop.
121
 These large protests occurred after the assumption of economic sanctions on 
REE, thus making it likely that a nationalist outcry could have been predicted by the CCP 
and may have influence the decision making, but not the trigger. Foreign-ministry 
spokesman Ma Zhaoxu stated it was “understandable that some people expressed their 
outrage over the Japanese words and deeds, but patriotism should be expressed rationally 
and in accordance with the law.”122 Protests occurred throughout China in September and 
October. As the incident died down, tensions abated, but the conflict had reinforced the 
growing divide between the two states, and the dispute over the Senkakus was far from 
over. Another incident occurred in 2012, with the Japanese government attempting to 
purchase the islands. As Richard Bush pointed out, frequent contact can ameliorate some 
issues, but as neighboring states with an unfriendly history, Japan and China’s recurring 
confrontations kept problems stewing.
123 
While the Chinese protests would tend to 
indicate support of hypothesis H4 of this research, the steps that China took, namely 
economic coercion and increased law-enforcement patrols, were not limited to dealings 
with Japan, a state that invokes a highly nationalist response—they are the same steps 
taken in the case with the Philippines, albeit different industries were targeted. 
Nationalism expressed on social media and editorials may have played a role in China’s 
response, but with the largest protests occurring in October, after the export ban on REE, 
they appear not to be the trigger of economic coercion. The October protests may have 
been a reason that the ban on exports of REE continued until November. 
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E. ANALYSIS OF THE INCIDENT 
The outrage exhibited by China and the REE embargo can be looked at from 
several different levels. First, at the domestic level, the Chinese population is extremely 
sensitive to perceived slights from Japan.
124
 Any incident seen as challenging Chinese 
interests will likely result in a popular demand for strong official responses, particularly if 
the incident involves Japan. In the Senkakus clash, this pattern held true. It would not be 
accurate to say that the PRC was at the mercy of these protests; the government is adept 
at shutting down or instigating protest when it serves foreign-policy needs. In 2005, 
protests against the Japanese textbooks were tolerated for three weeks, until the regime 
determined it was time to end them, which it did effectively.
125
 China has been able to 
exploit nationalism without allowing it to bleed too far into policy.
126
 Using nationalism 
at the bargaining table can be a useful tactic for the PRC if closely monitored by the 
regime. It appears that as in the 2010 incident, the CCP had control over how far the 
protests went, and manipulated them to signal disapproval to Japan. 
Second, at the international level, maintaining the status quo in territorial disputes 
is the second-most-important foreign-policy objective of the PRC.
127
 For example, China 
has expressed a desire to shelve its territorial disputes with other Southeast Asian states to 
enhance stability within the region. When perceived affronts occur, China may respond 
with economic coercion, as in the Scarborough Shoal incident.
128
 However, China does 
not always respond economically to states that challenge the status quo, as evident in the 
2007 clash between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands. China’s response to 
Vietnamese challenges was the use of military force to cement its position. Patrolling the 
area, Chinese naval vessels began detaining Vietnamese trawlers and even shot at one, 
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 China dispatched an unnamed number of ships to the Senkaku Islands 
in response to the 2010 incident, but those vessels, from the fisheries law-enforcement 
command, not from the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), have strictly 
maintained the status quo, not opening fire as against the Vietnamese.
130
 Clearly, the PRC 
does not regard economic coercion as a sole alternative, but will change its response 
based on the state it is squaring off against. With Vietnam not being democratic, it was 
not subject to similar domestic pressures that economic coercion can raise.131 As 
Hirschman notes, economic statecraft is more likely to be used in cases where the 
targeting state holds an asymmetrical trade advantage, whether across the economy or 
sector specific.
132
 Baldwin expounds on these ideas by arguing that not only is an 
asymmetrical relationship important, but economic statecraft is used at the international 
level to shape actor behaviors.
133
 These three conditions make the use of negative 
economic sanctions more likely when a strong state desires to constrain the behavior of a 
weaker state. Where these conditions do not exist, the use of other means to influence the 
target is more likely. 
F. THE USE OF ECONOMIC COERCION 
Diplomatic relations in 2010 were not as friendly as they had been, limiting the 
ability to resolve the Senkakus dispute diplomatically. With little diplomatic bargaining 
power due to Japan’s control of the islands, China took a tough stance, refusing to 
negotiate on the status of the islands and perceived an alteration of the status quo.  
Militarily, China had no ability to challenge Japan over the islands. While small, 
the Japanese maritime self-defense force is well equipped and capable. Much of its 
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technology and equipment was purchased from the U.S. and has been improving since 
the implementation of the 1996 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).
134
 The 2010 
NDPO has increased Japanese military modernization to keep pace with China’s 
modernization program.
135
 As Chinese modernization focuses on the PLAN, so too does 
the 2010 NDPO, increasing the number of destroyers and equipment while reducing the 
number of ground forces, artillery, and battle tanks. Unlike the Philippines, Japan is in a 
good position to counter any military action China may undertake in a territorial dispute, 
even without U.S. support, which, however, was available had the dispute over the 
Senkaku Islands become militarized. The U.S. has included the islands under the U.S.–
Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security since 1960, which enjoins U.S. 
intervention if Japan is attacked while defending the islands.
136
 The U.S. reiterated this 
stance in 2012 and 2014.
137
 The American backing of Japan made the pursuit of military 
action too costly for China, which was loath to risk war with either party. To protect 
Chinese fishermen, the fisheries law-enforcement command, which was later merged 
with other agencies to form the Chinese coast guard under the state oceanic 
administration, dispatched additional vessels to patrol the area.
138
 The combination of 
law-enforcement vessels to physically secure Chinese interests and economic statecraft to 
signal resolve proved sufficient to secure the release of Zhan and shore up China’s 
position without military force. 
Diplomacy succeeded in getting the crew and trawler released on September 13, 
2010, but China had to signal further resolve to release the captain, Zhan Qixiong. Thus, 
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China turned to sticks. There are two key aspects in the use of economic coercion by the 
PRC. First, it must have the ability to do so, either because China is dealing with a weak 
partner with whom it has strong economic ties or a strong partner with which China has 
an asymmetrical advantage, as in REE exports,
139
 a sector in which China could 
unilaterally manipulate and disrupt Japanese industry, wielding substantial coercive 
power. China, as the provider of a required raw material, could have slowed the 
production of Japanese goods by keeping ships carrying REE from heading to Japanese 
ports. This in turn, would create great domestic pressure for the Japanese to meet Chinese 
demands as the vital supply decreased to a drip. China’s near monopoly allowed it to 
target a specific sector, instead of utilizing more general sanctions to signal its 
displeasure. Second, Japan had few quick options for getting this essential resource. Its 
overwhelming percentage of the world market allowed China to effectively control the 
natural resource. The Chinese ban on REE allegedly went into effect on September 23, 
2010; Zhan was released the next day, on September 24th.
140
 While the ban may have led 
to the release of Zhan, its continuation through October and November showed that 
China’s ultimate aim was to show adamancy in the protection of its interests, supporting 
the fifth hypothesis of this research. By using an essential resource as a pawn and 
exploiting a virtual monopoly, China successfully threatened Japanese industry and, by 
extension, the Japanese government. 
G. CONCLUSION 
Although steady economic progress legitimizes the CCP, China is willing to look 
beyond economic growth when it perceives that territorial integrity and sovereignty are 
threatened. The Senkakus example is one in which China had an overwhelming 
advantage in the production of REE and could harm Japanese industry through a ban on 
exportation. Table 2 shows the amount of REE shipped from China to Japan in the period 
of concern, with the Chinese market share dropping from a high of 90 percent of total 
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Japanese imports to 61 percent in 2013.141 At its peak in 2007, China exported 36, 072 
metric tons of the selected REEs used.142 The REE ban led Japan to search for other 
sources, including domestic, and Chinese exports to Japan dropped to 9, 838 metric tons 
last year (see Table 2).143 In other words, Japan was shown its vulnerability and has taken 
steps to reduce it since 2010. As noted earlier, the Japanese importation of Chinese REE 
plummeted in October and November of 2010, enough to motivate Japan to search for 
other sources, which led to an overall decline in the use of Chinese REE. The 
employment of economic statecraft worked well for China, in that it maintained a desired 
status quo.  
The first and second hypotheses (H1&H2) are supported by this case study—
economic statecraft was used when China felt it necessary to signal resolve to prevent 
challenges to the status quo and territorial integrity. H5 is also supported: China used its 
asymmetrical advantage in the REE industry to impose costs and signal resolve to Japan. 
H3 is not supported; Japan did not attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the CCP, and 
H4 is only partially supported, nationalistic protests did not trigger the economic coercion 
but may have increased its longevity. Economic statecraft as defined uses positive or 
negative sanctions to influence the behavior of another actor; China’s deployment in 
2010 worked well due to Japanese dependency. China’s behavior followed Baldwin’s 
three aspects of economic statecraft: it exploited an economic advantage at the 
international level to shape the behavior of another actor. China had the means and desire 
to defend its territorial integrity and the status quo through economic coercion. 
  
                                                 




III. SCARBOROUGH SHOAL INCIDENT 2012 
The Scarborough Shoal Incident is the second case study to be examined and, like 
Chapter II, investigates the use of economic coercion in a territorial dispute. The chapter 
is organized to give background on the dispute, the events that occurred, and the possible 
triggers of Chinese economic coercion. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Two years after the 2010 Senkakus dispute, a political row occurred over a 
disputed set of islands 124 nautical miles off of the coast of the Philippines in the South 
China Sea (see Figure 2). Like other disputed areas in the South China Sea (SCS), the 
shoal has different names: the Philippines call it Panatag Shoal or Bajo de Masinloc, and 
China calls it Huangyan Island. China and the Philippines entered a two-month standoff 
in April 2012 over an attempted Philippine arrest of Chinese fishermen. Both sides 
perceived an affront to their territorial sovereignty, the Philippines believing that the 
fishermen were operating illegally within its exclusive economic zone and China 
believing that the attempted arrest of its citizens, particularly by a Philippine naval vessel, 
was a departure from the status quo in a territory that was part of China. The Philippine 
foreign secretary, Albert del Rosario, stated on April 11, “we have sovereignty and 
sovereign rights over the Scarborough Shoal and finally I mentioned that if the 
Philippines is challenged, we are prepared to secure our sovereignty.”144 As for China, 
the embassy in Manila released a statement that “urged the Philippine side to stop 
immediately their illegal activities and leave the area.”145 As a result, China once again 
capitalized on its economic dominance over a neighboring state, this time by imposing 
new import and travel restrictions.
146
 The standoff concluded with China’s retaining a 
presence near Scarborough Shoal to protect its fishing interests, following an initial 
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withdrawal of ships for a passing storm and an unchallenged return to control the area 
with maritime surveillance vessels. 
As noted in Chapter II, China may turn to sticks when it lacks military or 
diplomatic options to settle a dispute, has an asymmetrical economic relationship with the 
targeted state, or feels its territorial integrity has been challenged. In the case of the 
Scarborough Shoal, China used economic statecraft as part of a twofold strategy to show 
force by sending civilian surveillance vessels and by imposing costs on the democratic 
Philippine government to demonstrate resolve. The Scarborough Shoal case supports two 
of the hypotheses presented earlier, rejects two others, and supports H5 partially. In this 
case, economic statecraft was used to counter a perceived affront to the territorial 
integrity of China. H1 supports coercion to prevent changes to the status quo, particularly 
in the arrest and seizure of Chinese citizens and their property (H2). The hypotheses not 
supported are that economic coercion will be used when the CCP feels its legitimacy is 
challenged (H3) and that nationalism leads to more assertive foreign policy decisions 
(H4). Partially supported is the use of economic coercion in cases where China holds a 
bilateral trade advantage (H5). Coercion was used in two sectors in which China did 
indeed hold a wide margin of advantage, but the Chinese economy as a whole was 
important to the economic health of the Philippines, and China did not use wider negative 
sanctions to signal its resolve.  
Before discussing the use of economic coercion by the Chinese as directed against 
two sectors of the Philippine economy, some background on the standoff is presented. 
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Figure 2.  Scarborough Shoal147 
B. CLAIMS ON SCARBOROUGH SHOAL 
Both the Philippines and China lay claim to the Scarborough Shoal. Philippine 
claims date to the fifteenth century; the shoal lies 124 miles from the closest recognized 
Philippine territory.148 China claims the reef as a traditional fishing ground, illustrated on 
Chinese maps since the Yuan Dynasty.149 
1. The Philippine Claim 
The Philippine claim became active in the 1950s, when it was discovered 
uninhabited. This claim is supported by two arguments. First, the shoal is within the 
Philippine economic exclusion zone (EEZ) by 76 miles and is much closer to the 
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 Second, the government claims the shoal has been under its 
control since Philippine independence in 1946 and administers it as a part of the province 
of Zambales. Under the United Nations Law of the Sea Archipelagic Baselines Law, the 
Philippines filed to include Scarborough Shoal as its territory in 2009.
151
 These angles 
represent a case for the shoal that is based on legal foundations and simple enough for 
Filipinos to rally behind. 
2. The Chinese Claim 
China’s claims to the shoal go back further in history and center on the historical 
use of the area. China claims the reef as a traditional fishing ground for the southern 
provinces and claims that it was first discovered 2,000 years ago, asserting that the island 
was included on early Chinese maps and China has exercised administrative control since 
the Yuan dynasty. By contrast, Philippine maps did not include the shoal until recently.
152
 
In addition to the historical claim, China has also produced a map outlining its claims, 
which includes the “nine-dash line” used as evidence in nearly every territorial dispute 
China is involved in. The map has been submitted to the United Nations Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The nine-dash-line map has been used since the 
Kuomintang government in 1947 to substantiate claims on all exposed rocks between the 
line and the mainland. From east of Taiwan, the line extends south to just off the west 
coast of the Philippines and Malaysia, before turning north toward Vietnam. This large 
area includes many disputed islands—not only Scarborough Shoal, but the Paracel and 
Spratly chains as well, to which China claims historical rights.
153
 The Chinese claim over 
the island, combined with the PRC’s core interest in territorial integrity, support H1: 
China uses economic statecraft in the case of territorial infringement, as seen in the 
review of the shoal incident below. China considers that violations of its territorial 
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integrity and sovereignty, such as attempted law enforcement within its territories, must 
be met with a strong response. In the case of the Scarborough Shoals, economic coercion 
was part of China’s countermove. 
3. The Economic Impact of the Scarborough Shoal 
At the lowest tide, Scarborough Shoal is five rocks, unable to support human life, 
protruding from the SCS. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) notes 
that “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no EEZ or continental shelf.”154 Therefore, Scarborough Shoal does not qualify as a 
habitable island, and thus has no EEZ, but it does qualify for 12 nautical miles of 
territorial waters, according to UNCLOS Article 6.
155
 The region is strategically 
important for its resources and proximity to a major shipping lane. Ten percent of the 
world’s fishing catch comes from the South China Sea, making the shoals economically 
viable,
156
 because sovereignty over the shoal would effect a territorial outcropping in the 
SCS for either the Philippines or China and potentially strengthen China’s claims to other 
disputed territories, allowing China more territorial waters to control and a larger 
percentage of the global fisheries catch. But the pockets of territorial waters surrounding 
the Scarborough Shoal and other SCS territories not only offer a larger share of the 
fishery, they also open the gateway for unilateral oil exploration of the region. Although 
exact numbers are not available due to the lack of detailed surveys, it is estimated that the 
SCS could hold major oil and natural gas reserves possibly equaling 80 percent of the 
reserves in Saudi Arabia.
157
 For both states, but particularly for China, with its rapidly 
expanding metropolitan population and industry to support, gaining control of the shoal 
would be extremely valuable. 
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As for shipping, a quarter of the world’s shipping traffic goes through the SCS, 
including 65 percent of vessels supplying China’s energy needs.158 Control of 
Scarborough Shoal and a 12 nm periphery would subject commercial vessels to the 
owner of the outcroppings and restrict the navigation of military vessels, particularly 
those of the U.S. and regional states. As a growing economic power that has been a net 
importer of oil and natural gas since 1993, China sees that it may be vulnerable to an 
external state’s control over its energy resources. If China were to gain sovereignty over 
Scarborough Shoal, it would control a pocket of territorial sea inside the Philippine EEZ. 
Control of even a small part of the SCS would expand a state’s ability to extract resources 
from that portion of the sea and legitimate its claims to other disputed chains. As a matter 
of routine, both China and the Philippines are quick to respond to any challenges to their 
sovereignty and will officially denounce statements by the opposing side so as not to 
imply that their position is weakening.
159
  
C. SINO–PHILIPPINE DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Diplomatic cooperation between China and the Philippines improved from 1990 
until 2009, declining after the passage of Republic Act No. 9522 in the Philippines and 
the election of a hardline president, Benigno Aquino III, in 2010.160 Economic relations 
have continued to improve since 1997, with trade growing at over 140 percent.161  
1. Diplomatic Relations 
The Philippines and China have steadily increased their diplomatic cooperation 
since the 1990s. The number of Chinese living in the Philippines, and vice versa, has 
increased, and bilateral trade has expanded (see Table 3). Under the Gloria Arroyo 
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presidency, from 2001 to 2010, cooperation between the governments improved, 
although it was sometimes attributed to Arroyo’s encouraging economic growth by not 
taking a hard line on the disputed territories in the South China Sea.
162
 The Declaration 
on Conduct in the SCS (DOC) and the attempted development of the SCS through the 
Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) were put into action during her presidency. 
The DOC, signed in 2002, attempted to reduce further tensions to protect both states’ 
economic interests in the region, including trade.
163
 The JMSU was ventured as a joint 
natural-resource survey of the region between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, 
beginning in 2005. The project ended a few years later due to popular Philippine protests 
over Arroyo’s failure to protect Philippine sovereignty.164 Nevertheless, Arroyo yielded 
more cooperation in the SCS than did her predecessors or successor, despite whatever 
cost to Philippine sovereignty may have been involved. In 2009, relations took a step 
back as the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 9522, also known as the Philippine 
Baseline Act, which established a new maritime baseline for the Philippines, to include 
sovereignty over the Kalayaan group and Scarborough Shoal.
165
 Later that year, China 
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Table 3.   Percentage Growth In Sino-Philippine Trade167 
 
 
When President Aquino came to power in 2010, cooperation over the disputed 
islands continued to disintegrate as the two players engaged in territorial disputes over 
the South China Sea. China saw Aquino as a hardliner who refused to pursue 
cooperation, gaining domestic political support by focusing the people on an external 
threat.
168
 The Reed Bank incident, in which a Philippine survey ship was confronted by 
two Chinese patrol boats, leading to escalating Philippine shows of force via military 
aircraft and coast-guard escorts, kicked off 2011 as a year of skirmishes. These were 
partly instigated by the Philippines’ unilateral investigation of the region for natural 
resources.
169
 China viewed this action as setting a precedent for other states with which it 
had territorial disputes; in essence, relaxing its position in one dispute could make China 
vulnerable in others.
170
 The diplomatic rift was further exacerbated by the Philippine 
                                                 
167 “Philippine Participation at the 10th China-ASEAN Expo 2013,” Center for International Trade 
Expositions and Missions. 
168 Zemin, “An Insight into South China Sea Dispute and Beijing’s Bottom Line From the Perspective 
of PRC-Philippines Standoff over South China Sea,” 2. 
169 Stirring Up the South China Sea (II), 7; Ian Storey, “China and the Philippines: Implications of the 
Reed Bank Incident,” China Brief, vol. 11, no. 8, Jamestown Foundation (2011), http://www.jamestown 
.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37902# .U9VzyfldVqU 
170 Zemin, “An Insight into South China Sea Dispute and Beijing’s Bottom Line From the Perspective 
of PRC-Philippines Standoff over South China Sea,” 5. 
 47 
government’s reference to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea” in October 
2011.
171
 While economic integration has continued, rows over disputed territories have 
damaged diplomatic relations.
172
 The Scarborough Shoal standoff in 2012 brought 
tensions to a fever pitch, creating diplomatic rifts that would have to be overcome if the 
standoff were to end through negotiation. 
2. Economic Relations 
The increasing economic dependence of the Philippines on China set the stage for 
possible economic coercion by increasing the mutual reliance and vulnerability of both 
states. Without a high level of trade, negative economic sanctions could not coerce a state 
to change its behavior, particularly in areas where the trade balance is asymmetric, with 
one side banking trade surpluses or sector-specific advantages. China and the Philippines 
have enjoyed the benefits of mutual trade since 1975, with China now the third largest 
trading partner for the Philippines.
173
 In the 15 years before the Scarborough Shoal 
standoff, bilateral trade grew from $874 million to $12.6 billion, a remarkable growth of 
over 140 percent, and averaged a growth rate of 12.28 percent over the four years 
preceding the standoff (see Table 3).
174
 Chinese investments in the Philippines topped 
$251 million in 2011, with the majority going toward the power, mining, and 
manufacturing sectors.
175
 For the Philippines, China is an important market, not only for 
its fruit industry, but also for electrical products and mined resources.
176
 Even with the 
increase in trade, only 0.89 percent of China’s total trade involved the Philippines and 
0.75 percent of Chinese imports came from the Philippines in 2011 (see Table 4).177 FDI 
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and import numbers were equally low as a part of China’s total FDI and importation. By 
contrast, China made up over 11 percent of the Philippines total trade in 2011and sent 12 
percent of its exports to China (see Table 5).178 In addition, 10 percent of Philippine 
imports came from China, China provided over 18 percent of the total FDI flowing into 
the Philippines in 2011.
179
 As a result, economically speaking, the Philippines were a 
minor market for China and received a small portion of its investment, while China was a 
large market for the Philippines, on which over 10 percent of the Philippine GDP 
depended.
180
 In this bilateral relationship, China held the advantage, able to lose the 
Philippines as a trading partner without much effect on its overall economy—while the 
loss of China as a major trading partner for the Philippines would threaten 10 percent of 
its GDP and trade. With China important to the Philippine economy and the Philippines 
negligible to the Chinese, clearly China could afford coercion. 
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Table 4.   Percentage of Philippine Trade in the Chinese Economy181 
 
Table 5.   Percentage of Chinese Trade in the Philippine Economy182 
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D. THE SCARBOROUGH SHOAL STANDOFF 
On the morning of April 8, 2012 a Philippine maritime-patrol aircraft sighted 
eight Chinese fishing vessels in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal and reported their 
position. The standoff began when the Gregorio Del Pilar, the Philippine navy’s most 
advanced vessel, formerly a U.S. Coast Guard cutter, moved into the area two days later 
and searched a vessel, finding live sharks, giant clams, and corals, and moved to arrest 
the fishermen on charges of poaching. Two Chinese surveillance vessels belonging to the 
China Marine Surveillance Agency (CMSA) and responsible for law enforcement within 
Chinese waters, the Haijian 75 and Haijian 84, positioned themselves to prevent the 
arrest and search of more fishing boats.
183
 The CMSA merged with other agencies to 




Both parties to the action immediately denounced each other for infringement on 
territorial waters and illegal actions.
185
 Two days later, a third Chinese surveillance vessel 
arrived and a smaller Philippine coast-guard vessel arrived to relieve the Gregorio Del 
Pilar, which needed refueling and replenishment. The Gregorio Del Pilar sailed for port 
shortly thereafter.
186
 On the April 13, China dispatched more marine-surveillance ships 
from the CMSA and some of the fishing boats were able to head back to China under 
protection of Chinese ships.
187
 By April 15 all fishing boats had departed the area.
188
 
Early in the standoff, the number of vessels involved dwindled to as low as one per side, 
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until China redeployed additional surveillance vessels to the shoal.
189
 Throughout April, a 
series of cyber-attacks were allegedly conducted, targeting university websites on both 
sides and news and government websites in the Philippines.
190
 
The situation escalated in May with China imposing additional inspections and 
quarantines on fruit imported from the Philippines and issuing a travel warning that 
resulted in the cancellation of group tours to the Philippines. The inspections and 
quarantines involved several types of fruit, but were aimed mainly at bananas, a large 
export crop particularly in the southern province of Mindanao.
191
 The quarantine caused 
an estimated 1 billion PHP (approximately 23 million USD) in losses as fruit rotted on 
Chinese docks.
192
 China stated that the quarantine was imposed due to a discovery of 
insects and bacteria on shipments of bananas.
193
 In Xinhua, Aquino was reported as 
shifting some of the blame to Philippine exporters.
194
  
The travel restriction caused the cancellation of 15–20 percent of all airline tickets 
from mainland China to the Philippines from May to September 2012, a major blow to 
the tourist industry.
195
 China claimed that the travel warning was merely a precaution 
against the possibility of anti-Chinese demonstrations in the Philippines.
196
 Both the 
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banana quarantine and tourism restriction were intended to telegraph resolve concerning 
Scarborough Shoal. 
The standoff broke on June 16 with the Philippines announcing that an agreement 
had been reached for both sets of ships to withdraw due to weather concerns as the 
typhoon season began.
197
 The Philippine vessels left almost immediately and the Chinese 
vessels withdrew on June 24. Following the passing of the storm on June 26, some of the 
Chinese ships returned to the shoal, unchallenged. China continues to assert its 
sovereignty around the region with impunity, through maritime-surveillance ships that 
protect Chinese fishermen in the area. The conclusion of the standoff so far is that China 
has taken de facto control of the shoal. 
E. THE USE OF ECONOMIC COERCION 
China as a rising power has time on its side in all territorial disputes, but was 
forced to take action for two reasons. First, the PRC claimed that Philippine actions 
within the region were illegal and violated Chinese sovereignty.
198
 In the eyes of the 
Chinese, the Philippines initiated the standoff by its aggressive actions, and China was 
forced to counter to maintain the status quo ante. The Philippines were in direct violation 
of the DOC, requiring China to send surveillance vessels.
199
 Second, China’s need to 
protect its fishermen and their vessels necessitated a response. Just as they reacted to the 
Japanese arrest of a fishing crew in 2010, the attempt to search and seize was viewed as a 
provocation, particularly as it was done by a naval rather than a law-enforcement vessel. 
The attempted arrest at Scarborough Shoal challenged Chinese interests in the region and 
disrupted the status quo, supporting hypothesis H2, that the PRC uses economic coercion 
to defend Chinese citizens, property, and the status quo. This affair was compounded, in 
the Chinese view, by the declining cooperation between the two governments and 
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hardening of Aquino’s response.200 Based on its interpretation of the standoff as a 
violation of the status quo, the threatened arrest of Chinese citizens, and the use of a 
Philippine warship for a policing action, China felt compelled to signal resolve and 
strengthen its claim to the shoal. 
As in the Senkakus case, China was faced with three options with which to assert 
its claim: diplomacy, military might, or economic coercion. Diplomatically, China did 
attempt to placate the Philippines and ease the standoff by sticking to its position and 
expressing both its right to the shoal and its wish for a peaceable outcome. Bilateral 
meetings were held to solve the crisis, but were often suspended or cancelled due to 
misunderstandings or vexatious moves on both sides, and concluded without 
resolution.
201
 In an apparent response to a statement by Philippine foreign secretary 
Albert Del Rosario, China continued to urge diplomacy. A spokesman of the CFM, Hong 
Lei, stated, “the Chinese side demands the Philippine side seriously respect China’s 
territorial sovereignty and stop all moves that will expand and complicate the 
situation.”202 The dispute has lasted several years, with each side attempting to resolve it 
through diplomatic channels. The present standoff has not encouraged success in 
diplomatic negotiations and the Philippines has appealed to the international community 
for assistance, unsuccessfully calling on ASEAN to side against China, and has 
investigated its options under UNCLOS.
203
 
In the background of the negotiations between China and the Philippines was the 
presumed Chinese perception of U.S. support for the Philippines, which had two 
diplomatic effects. First, it weakened the position of China, who faced an adversary with 
a powerful friend. This unspoken assumption led to America’s playing a role in the 
mediation of the dispute, despite its insistence that the U.S. took no position. The U.S.’s 
perceived backing raised the bargaining position of the Philippines, making it less weak 
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and small than it would otherwise have appeared.
204
 How far the U.S. was willing to back 
the Philippines is unknown, making the possibility of its support a factor. While not 
outwardly stating that it feared the possibility of the U.S. taking the side of the 
Philippines, repeated statements were made to discourage any state to become involved 
in what China considered to be a bilateral dispute. A Chinese foreign ministry 
spokesman, although not explicitly naming the U.S., claimed “The Philippines' attempt to 
draw any third party for disruption of or intervention into this issue in any form will 
surely escalate the situation, or even change the nature of this issue.”205 In the end, the 
U.S. did not move to protect the Philippines, although China could not assume this at the 
time.  
Second, knowing that it could not compete with China without the backing of the 
U.S. led the government of the Philippines not only to seek assistance, but to delay the 
dispute until it officially arrived, in order to strengthen its bargaining position. That 
support never came. The 1951 U.S.–Philippine mutual-defense treaty was not clarified to 
state whether it included Scarborough Shoal or the South China Sea, and the standoff was 
eventually ended by a threatening storm as the two states’ ships withdrew. 
Diplomatically, although it reached out for help from ASEAN and the backing of the 
U.S., the Philippines did not attempt to delegitimize or undermine CCP rule within 
China, thus not supporting the third hypothesis of this thesis. In addition, while a few 
localized protests did occur and the website hacking was no doubt inspired by 
nationalism, there is little evidence that those actions hardened the foreign policy of 
China, as predicted in the fourth hypothesis (H4). As shown in the previous chapter, 
cases in which threats were made to the status quo or territorial integrity elicited similar 
responses, regardless of the level of nationalist fervor directed toward the target state. 
Militarily, despite superior might, China could not directly use the PLAN for two 
reasons. First, the U.S.–Philippine treaty might have been invoked, bringing China and 
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the U.S. into armed conflict. While China’s military is superior to its regional neighbors, 
it is still not ready to compete with the U.S., especially far from shore and close to an 
American ally from which logistical and air support could be launched. The threat of U.S. 
intervention was enough of a deterrent that China did not send naval vessels, even though 
the initiating vessel on the Philippine side was its most modern warship.  
Instead, China sent what amounted to coast-guard vessels. While not PLAN ships, 
they were enough to seize control of the area following the standoff and protect Chinese 
interests. Sending in the Chinese military would surely have elicited a stronger reaction 
from the Philippines and increased Philippine domestic insistence that the U.S. live up to 
its treaty obligations. The U.S. government sent mixed signals as to whether it would 
include the shoal in the mutual-defense treaty. On one hand, Secretary of State Clinton 
stated during the standoff that the U.S. would not take a side.
206
 By contrast, in a speech 
during the row, Senator John McCain declared that American support for the treaty was 
as strong as ever.
207
 To exacerbate the situation, the Philippines and the U.S. continued 
with planned military exercises during the standoff and the Philippines announced it was 
receiving additional U.S. military aid.
208
 It is unclear whether the U.S. would have gotten 
involved, but the possibility was certainly a looming threat in Chinese military 
calculations. 
Second, China’s bargaining power in the Scarborough Shoal and other disputes is 
not declining relative to the Philippines, thus incentivizing China not to engage militarily 
until its modernization program is complete. Under this scenario, China’s position can 
only improve with time. In terms of relative power, China is already strong in the region 
and continues to grow stronger. Its economy is growing, its diplomatic clout is 
increasing, and its military spends more than any other Asian power as modernization 
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plans continue to improve its might. As a state’s bargaining power increases, so also does 
its incentive not to engage in disputes that could lead to military conflict.
209
 The state has 
more to gain by biding its time with smaller states and waiting as its relative power 
increases. Even in facing the U.S., China has incentive to wait. As China’s power grows, 
one of two things will happen: either China will overtake the U.S. as its power increases 
and American power declines, as some models have predicted, or the relative power gap 
will decrease, even if the U.S. stays more powerful. China, therefore, had little incentive 
to engage the Philippines in a military fight that might bring in the U.S. 
Unable to solve the standoff diplomatically and with little incentive to escalate 
militarily, China signaled resolve through a combination of maritime surveillance vessels 
to secure the area and economic statecraft. Although time is on the side of China due to 
its increasing power the perceived provocation required a response to ensure that the 
Philippines did not take de facto control of the shoal. With a large investment in the 
Philippines already, China had better incentives to use of economic coercion to signal 
resolve. China was already providing 13 percent of the Philippine’s official development 
assistance and $251 million in investment in 2011, so it figured that sticks were likely to 
work better than carrots,
210
 and in the event, its fruit and travel sanctions did elicit the 
desired response of the Philippines’s backing away.  
The Philippines were susceptible for two reasons. First, as a democracy, the 
Philippines is vulnerable to pressure from special-interest groups, and unpopular foreign-
policy decisions can threaten reelection. The banana quarantine in particular produced 
strong political pressure on the Aquino government. Because the majority of the crop 
comes from Mindanao, the fallout unequally burdened one segment of the population and 
threatened 200,000 jobs.
211
 The localization of the impact leveraged the use of the 
governed against the government, creating pressure from both industrial leaders and local 
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Second, Chinese had an asymmetric advantage in the fruit sector to exploit.
213
 
This trade imbalance put time on China’s side with respect to sanctions, and the 
withdrawal of the Philippine coast-guard vessels due to weather provided an opportunity 
for China to further its claims by occupying the area. Denying that its imposition of 




The travel warning, which constituted led to an estimated one million USD in 
losses for the industry, worked similarly.
215
 It also fell on one sector of the economy, the 
tourist industry, but the effects were not as localized. The tourist industry is mainly 
centered on Luzon, but other islands were impacted as well. Again, China had an 
advantage in the relationship by being the fourth-largest source of tourists to the 
Philippines; a similar warning issued by the Philippines toward China would not have 
had much impact on the Chinese tourist trade.
216
 The use of negative sanctions in only 
two sectors only partially supports hypothesis H5, that coercion is used when China has a 
trade advantage over the target. China did exploit an asymmetry, as discussed; but, 
holding sway over 10 percent of the Philippine GDP, it could have signaled its resolve 
with much greater strength. 
The two negative economic sanctions imposed political costs on a democratic 
state. The Philippine government was vulnerable to losing power following the dispute, 
because China enjoyed an advantageous relationship in both industries and could target 
them without burdening itself. China perceived that its status quo and interests were 
being challenged, forcing it to assert its claim through economic coercion and occupation, 
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thus supporting the second hypothesis (H2). As the Chinese returned to the region 
following the storm, the political costs associated with the furtherance of negative 
economic sanctions and more standoffs with Chinese vessels prevented Aquino from 
countering. China was prepared to carry out the quarantine and ban for quite some time, 
making the conflict far costlier to the Philippines than to China. Different export 
restrictions, such as the ones used in the Senkakus dispute a few years earlier, would have 
caused China to take on more of the cost than the quarantine and travel warning. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The goal of economic coercion is to maximize the cost of negative economic 
sanctions for the target while minimizing the cost to the initiating state, and the banana 
and travel industries provided excellent asymmetrical relationships in which to work. The 
combination of the democratic nature of the Philippines plus the large advantage that 
China held in trade allowed it to shape Philippine governmental decisions through 
economic coercion, targeting vulnerable sectors to produce internal political pressure 
while minimizing economic impacts to itself. Whether the South China Sea is truly a core 
interest for the Chinese is a matter of debate. In any case, China’s claims remain 
steadfast, as does its core interest of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Clearly, 
perceived territorial violations and deviations from the status quo challenged Chinese 
interests. Since diplomatic meetings had largely failed early on in the crisis and, owing to 
the U.S.–Philippine treaty, China was not prepared to defend its claim militarily, the only 
option was to pursue economic coercion to signal resolve and use maritime-surveillance 
ships to enforce sovereignty. While the typhoon forced the Philippine vessels to 
withdraw, it was actually political risk that prevented the Philippines from continuing the 
confrontation as China resumed its maritime patrols and cemented its claim.  
In the Scarborough Shoal case, it appears that only H1, territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, and H2, the status quo, are fully supported. H5, asymmetric trade 
relationships, is partially supported, but the economic coercion was used as a condition of 
the first two and not as fully as it might have been. The asymmetric trade relationship 
operates as an underlying precursor to provide the conditions necessary for economic 
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coercion. H3, regime legitimacy, is not supported by this case. The dispute over 
Scarborough Shoal continues, with many of the diplomatic and military qualifiers 
unchanged, making the use of future economic coercion in the region likely—particularly 
in defense of China’s territorial integrity. 
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IV. THE DALAI LAMA IN EUROPE 
The final full case study to be presented, the Dalai Lama case study is different 
from the previous two in that it is not a dispute over territory and involves states outside 
of China’s region. China’s use of economic coercion is discussed through less overt 
means of influencing neighboring states. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While famously urging patience in territorial integrity issues, Communist Party 
Leader Deng Xiaoping is also credited with observing, “no one should expect China to 
swallow the bitter fruit that hurts its interest.”217 China reiterated this phrase in response 
to key meetings with the Dalai Lama, particularly the 2010 President Barack Obama–
Dalai Lama meeting.
218 
If China was willing to speak so menacingly to a state whose 
economy is greater than its own, less powerful states may well anticipate retaliation for 
meeting with the Dalai Lama. Tibet continues to be a sensitive subject in Chinese foreign 
policy, and meetings between heads of state and the Dalai Lama will at best cause the 
Chinese administration to react with strongly worded statements and at worse with 
negative economic sanctions. In recent years, several heads of state in Europe have met 
with the Dalai Lama, causing China to react negatively, cancelling trade summits and 
high level meetings and suspending trade on certain items. Although similar to the 
previous case studies, the use of economic coercion in this case is more subtle. The 
cancellation of meetings can cause missed economic opportunities and the suspension of 
tourism can affect an important industry, but a specific sector, like REEs, was not 
targeted. The closest to that level of economic coercion was the suspension of an Airbus 
contract, which was resumed later. China views any meetings between the Dalai Lama 
and heads of state as challenges to its sovereignty in Tibet. In protection of that 
sovereignty and the continuation of Chinese rule, China turns to coercion to extract 
desired behavior from its European trading partners. 
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Based on the cases that follow, three hypotheses are supported: the use of 
economic statecraft in the cases of perceived territorial infringement (H1), usage when 
there are challenges to the status quo (H2) of Chinese rule, and, thus, regime legitimacy 
(H3). The last two hypotheses are not supported. Nationalism against the EU did not 
harden the foreign policy of China, nor did economic asymmetry play a role (H5). While 
there is much information available on human rights in Tibet and the means of control 
currently available to the Chinese government, such a discussion is outside of the scope 
of this research. Rather, China’s claims on Tibet are presented, along with counter claims 
by the exiled government and the current standing of EU–Chinese diplomatic and 
economic relations. This data provides a background for the two cases presented: the 
Dalai Lama’s meeting with German chancellor Angela Merkel on September 23, 2007, 
and with French and EU president Nicholas Sarkozy on December 6, 2008. Analysis of 
China’s use of coercion against Germany, France, and the EU is made to evaluate the 
hypotheses of this research. 
B. CLAIMS ON TIBET 
China’s claims on Tibet are internationally recognized. China claims it began to 
administer Tibet during the Yuan dynasty in [year].219 The Central Tibetan 
Administration claims to embrace the Dalai Lama’s wish for a more meaningful 
autonomy in Tibet, not succession.220 
1. China’s Claims 
China’s claims to Tibet go back to the Han dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD), when it 
claims the first bilateral relationship was established. By the Tang dynasty (618 – 907), 
that relationship was well established and flourishing. It was under the Yuan dynasty that 
dynastic rule in Tibet was finally cemented, beginning with the Mongol empire’s taking 
control of the region, which eventually was transferred to the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), 
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instituted by Kublai Khan to control all of what was considered China at the time. When 
the Ming dynasty came to power after the fall of the Yuan, it inherited the right to rule 
the region and administered Tibet from 1368–1644. Once the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) 
took over, it continued ruling Tibet, with the power to confirm all Buddhist 
reincarnations of leaders, including the Dalai Lama. In 1727, the Qing established the 
first high commissioner to Tibet to administer the Tibetan region, a practice that lasted 
until its collapse. Once the Republic of China was declared, Sun Yat-sen proclaimed in 
his inaugural speech that “the unification of lands inhabited by the Han, Manchu, 
Mongol, Hui and Tibetan people into one country means the unification of the Han, 
Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan races.” Tibetans were allowed to participate in 
statewide elections, giving them full participatory rights in the new government. Once the 
CCP took over in 1949, they called for the Tibetan local leadership to send 
representatives to Beijing, but the request was ignored and in 1950, PLA troops invaded 
Tibet and “liberated” the territory.221 The PRC has controlled the territory since, but the 
common program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
provided for the regional autonomy of Tibet. The CPPCC established some regional 
authority, but also outlawed any nationalist agendas intent on “splitting of the unity of the 
various nationalities.”222 Regional autonomy was confirmed a few years later in 1951 
with the signing of the Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local 
Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, also referred to as 
the Seventeen-Point Agreement.
223
 From 1951 until the present, the PRC successfully 
consolidated and retained its rule over Tibet. 
2. Central Tibetan Administration’s Claims 
The Tibetan government in exile has a different take on Tibet’s relationship with 
China. Claiming that it has over 2,000 years of written history, the Central Tibetan 
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Administration (CTA) maintains that Tibet was a sovereign state before China’s 
invasion.
224
 Thus the leadership does not characterize China’s entry as liberation. The 
Dalai Lama, the head of the government until his retirement in 2011, fled Tibet to 
Dharamsala, India, in 1959 after an alleged failed attempt to capture him.
225
 Although no 
longer leading the government, he remains the spiritual leader for Tibet. The Seventeen-
Point Agreement that China flourishes to legitimate its rule was claimed by the Dalai 
Lama in a statement after his escape to have been signed under duress.
226
 The Dalai Lama 
does currently advocate independence, but only full autonomy, including the 
establishment of a democratic regional government. In his middle-way approach, the 
Dalai Lama proposed a new type of autonomy, in which Tibet still belonged to China and 
would not be independent, but would govern itself.
227
 Despite these proclamations, the 
Dalai Lama is accused of encouraging the Tibetan independence movement. In particular, 
his trips abroad are seen as a way to gain international support. Europe has been a 
popular destination; 60 percent of the Dalai Lama’s travels from 1991–2008, were to 
Europe.
228
 It is his meetings with heads of state that concern China. 
3. The Importance of Tibet to China 
After the signing of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, China has seen any meeting 
with the Dalai Lama or statement on Tibet as a foreign power as interfering with China’s 
internal affairs. China relates issues on Tibet to its core interests of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity
229
 and claims that despite his words to the contrary, the actions of the 
Dalai Lama show that he is at heart a separatist, working toward an independent state. 
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China frequently refers to the exiled government and its supporters as the “Dalai Lama 
clique,” and claims they have founded a conspiracy for separatism.230 In 2008, the 
Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, stated, “the Dalai Lama issue is not a religious or 
ethnic issue, but one concerning China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”231 He also 
confirmed that “the Dalai Lama’s conspiracy to split Tibet from China and his 
secessionist attempt is doomed to fail.”232 As a result, any interference in Tibet that could 
lead to a separate Tibetan state might inspire the separatists in Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia, two of China’s other autonomous regions. The Dalai Lama’s participation in 
an allied committee with other ethnic minorities in autonomous regions does little to 
assuage these fears.
233
 Time is on the side of China; it controls the territory and all the 
leverage in the region and continues to increase in strength.
234
 Interference from an 
outside power could change this and, as a result, China repeatedly rejects offers of 
mediation and third-party intervention in Tibet, including an offer from Norway.
235
 Like 
most states, China is unwilling to reduce its territory based on the nationalist agenda of 
the population and is willing to secure that territory by force. The CCP would become the 
party that lost Tibet, and if the dominos fall, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, reducing its 
ability to hold onto power. This reality supports H3; meetings between heads of state and 
the Dalai Lama challenge the CCP’s rule in Tibet and possibly in the state as a whole. 
C. SINO–EU DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Up until 2005, diplomatic relations between the EU and China were improving. In 
2005, the relationship became a bit more strained with the continuation of the EU arms 
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embargo against China that was under consideration for reversal.236 Like the previous 
case studies, the economic relationship has continued to blossom, with trade in goods up 
300 percent since 2003, despite the downturn in diplomatic relations.237 
1. Diplomatic Relations 
Diplomatic relations between the EU and China have been improving since their 
establishment in 1975, under a precursor to the EU known as the European Political 
Cooperation Agreement.
238
 The shadow of the century of humiliation, in which many of 
the states in the EU carved up parts of China, loomed, but relations improved steadily. At 
the 2003 EU–China summit, there was some conversation about the development of a 
“strategic partnership,” and 2004 was a banner year for cooperation.239 In 2004, there 
were 206 official visits from EU officials to China. However, in 2005 the relationship 
began to suffer when negotiations with China over ending the arms embargo failed.
240
 
The embargo, which was enacted in 1989 as a response to the crackdown on Tiananmen 
Square protesters, restricted the sale of military weaponry to China. The arms embargo 
was opposed by Angela Merkel, chancellor of Germany, reportedly because of 
differences in human rights. This was particularly striking to China, because her 
predecessor, Gerhard Schrӧder, supported abolishing the ban.241 In addition, Chinese 
goods exports to the EU began to climb, causing concern over the flood of Chinese-made 
textiles and an increasing trade deficit with China.
242
 Mostly, relations began to suffer 
over concerns about the Chinese human-rights record, the environment, and democratic 
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values that the EU sees as important. The Dalai Lama is popular in Europe precisely 
because they see him as embodying many of these values.
243
 
In addition to the arms-embargo rift, after the Dalai Lama’s Merkel meeting but 
before the Sarkozy meeting, a series of protests in Paris disrupted the April 2008 
Olympic-torch relay. The protesters combined a number of issues on which Europe 
criticizes China, but China considers them to be internal, such as human rights, 
democracy, Taiwan, and the ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang.
244
 The protests an 
embarrassed China and brought attention on the French popular stance on Tibet. In 
December of the same year, Sarkozy agreed to meet with the Dalai Lama. From the 
Chinese perspective, this looked like two attempted interferences with a domestic issue in 
less than a year, challenging the CCP and straining relationships. 
Overall, some of the diplomatic tension that has occurred since 2005 centers on 
the different interpretations of sovereignty held by the EU and China. Ironically, China 
holds steadfastly to the original principle of sovereignty that originated out of Europe, as 
the right to a lack of interference in domestic matters from third parties. Europe’s view of 
sovereignty has shifted. The EU comprises states that have agreed to surrender control 
over some of their state functions to a larger body.
245
 The EU tends to focus not on 
economic development, as China does, but on the advancement of liberal ideals, mainly 
human rights. Conversely, China focuses strictly on economic development and the 
continuity of the Chinese state. These differing views do not provide a foundation from 
which to expand diplomatic relations. As Zhongpi Pan, a Chinese scholar observed, “for 
China, the EU is too stubborn to move beyond a human rights perspective when dealing 
with China: for the EU, China is too stubborn to renew its outdated notion of 
sovereignty.”246 
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2. Economic Relations 
Although the EU and China place different premiums on human rights and 
sovereignty and despite the strained diplomatic relations in 2005, the economic 
relationships between China and the EU have flourished, from 2003–2013, trade in goods 
increased nearly 300 percent (see Table 6).247 In 2003, while good diplomatic relations 
entered their peak, trade between the two surged $120 billion.
248
 China is the EU’s 
second-largest trading partner, with investments in 24,000 firms in China up to 2006.
249
 
Also in 2006, 80 percent of the European companies in China reported growth, and the 
EU provided the fourth most FDI.
250
 This trade has been beneficial for China as well, 
with four of the top 10 trading partners for China in the EU and China holding a large 
trade surplus. China claims this surplus to be $70.1 billion, but the EU estimates it closer 
to $132.2 billion.
251
 In 2006, the EU passed the U.S. as the largest trading partner for 
China.
252
 In trade in goods, trade between China and the EU accounted for around 10 
percent of the EU’s total trade in 2006.253 By comparison, the EU held 18 percent of the 
total trade in goods by China in 2006.
254
 Both states are almost equal in mutual important 
in terms of economic development and trade, with the EU having a slight edge in 
percentage of total trade. That being the case, China does hold a trade surplus with the 
EU, one that creates a slight asymmetrical relationship, but the instigation of a trade war 
would harm China more. 
While consistently rising, trade relations did have a few stumbles after the 
downturn in diplomatic relations in 2005. First, the inflow of textiles from China to 
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Europe after the ending of the World Trade Organization (WTO) quotas in 2005 caused 
some pushback from the EU. The WTO had from 1974–2005 allowed some protection 
for domestic textile manufacturers, but the end to those restrictions opened up the textile 
industry to the regular, less protectionist, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) regulations.
255
 China responded by flooding the European market with cheaper 
textiles. The EU countered by imposing quotas on Chinese textiles and once those were 
reached, held up Chinese goods in the port of debarkation. A deal was eventually reached 
a few months later, in which the EU would release the products on the condition that half 
of them counted toward the 2006 quota.
256
 The Chinese media applauded the deal as 




The other economic concern of the EU that came to light in 2005 with the 
increase in trade was the corresponding increase of the trade deficit with China. This was 
a result of two compounding factors. First, the renminbi has depreciated against the euro 
dollar, making the EU less competitive within Chinese markets, down 10 percent from 
2005 to 2007. Second, China simply exports to the EU more than it imports from it (see 
Table 6), mostly due to the different levels of development of the competing economies. 
This caused a concern that the market in China was not as open to European trade as it 
could be.
258
 Despite these issues, the amount of total trade, including imports to China 
from the EU, steadily increased from 2003. 
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Table 6.   EU-China trade in goods in billions of USD259 
 
D. NOTABLE EU MEETINGS WITH THE DALAI LAMA 
Two meetings between the Dalai Lama and EU heads of state raised objections 
from China in 2007 and 2008. 
1. The 2007 Angela Merkel–Dalai Lama Meeting 
As noted earlier, relations between the EU and China have been deteriorating 
since 2005, and two meetings with the Dalai Lama caused the diplomatic rift to open 
further. Two years after she took office as the chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel of 
the Christian Democratic Union Party held a meeting with the Dalai Lama on September 
23, 2007, in which they discussed human rights issues in Tibet.
260
 Merkel, as the first 
German chancellor to receive the Dalai Lama, was allegedly advised against the meeting, 
but decided to go ahead because she felt it would support her “value-oriented foreign 
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policy.”261 The Chinese leadership was predictably angry about the meeting and 
responded by cancelling several high-level meetings and withdrawing from sessions on 
human rights and the environment.
262
 The cancellation of high-level meetings led to a 
decrease in trade cooperation over the short-term and missed trade mission opportunities. 
According to German media reports, the Chinese told the German diplomats in Beijing 
that Merkel had “crossed a red line” in meeting with the Dalai Lama.263 Jiang Yu, a 
spokesperson for the CFM, stated shortly after the meeting that “Merkel’s meeting with 
Dalai Lama was not only a rude interference into China’s internal affairs and strongly 
hurt the feelings and emotions of the Chinese people, but also gravely harmed China-
Germany relations.”264 
In a press conference in November 2007, Wen Jiabao said that “We oppose 
European leaders meeting and receiving the Dalai Lama in their official capacity.”265 It 
was noted that when dignitaries from other nations visited China shortly thereafter, 
Chinese officials openly made disparaging remarks about Germany.
266
 As a core interest, 
the issue of Tibetan sovereignty is sensitive in Beijing, particularly when Merkel’s 
predecessor chose Chinese economic cooperation over the Tibet issue.
267
 The Chinese 
ambassador to Berlin, Ma Canrong, addressed the meeting and the future of relations, 
stating, “relations have been seriously impaired by the reception of the Dalai Lama in the 
federal chancellor’s office.”268 Foreign-ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao also blamed the 
downgraded ties on Germany and expressed a desire for Germany to make amends to 
                                                 
261 Stefan Kornelius and Edeltraud Rattenhuber, “Crisis Between Beijing and Berlin,” September 22, 
2007, Open Source Center (EUP20070922085011). 
262 “Lasting Consequences,” Der Speigel, October 15, 2007, Open Source Center 
(EUP20071014085024). 
263 Ibid. 
264 Xinhua, “China Strongly Dissatisfied with Merkel’s meeting with Dalai Lama,” September, 26, 
2007, Open Source Center (CPP20070925062006). 
265 Sun Yu-ting and Wang Yan, “Wen Jiabao: [We] Oppose European Leaders Meeting, Receiving 
Dalai Lama in Official Capacity,” Zhongguo Xinwen She, November 28, 2007, Open Source Center 
(CPP20071128354005). 
266 Brown and Crossick, “The EU and China Time for a Change?” 4. 
267 Li, “China-EU Relations: Strategic Partnership at a Crossroads,” 236. 
268 ARH, “China’s Ambassador: Relations with Germany ‘Seriously Impaired,’” Der Deutscher 




 Merkel defended meeting with the Dalai Lama, stating that as 
a world leader, she alone decides whom she can meet with and that “a conversation with 
the Dalai Lama in the chancellor’s office must be possible, and it calls into question 
neither Germany’s “One China policy” nor China’s importance as an emerging economic 
power.”270 
A few months after the incident, China seemed ready to move on, with CFM 
spokesperson Liu Jianchao stating that the Chinese “hope China–Germany relations 
could move forward on a sound and smooth track as soon as possible which is in the 
interest of both countries,” although he also characterized the Merkel–Dalai Lama 
meeting as “erroneous.”271 In January 2008, tensions had abated, with Merkel repeatedly 
confirming China’s sovereignty over Tibet and arranging a meeting between the Chinese 
foreign minister, Yang Jiechi and his German counterpart.
272
 Media coverage in China, 
which had previously been critical of Germany, also turned more positive, signaling that 
relations were bettering between the two states.
273
 However, the EU would continue to 
create diplomatic issues over Tibet with protests during the 2008 Olympic torch relay and 
another Dalai Lama meeting. 
2. The 2008 Nicolas Sarkozy–Dalai Lama Meeting 
A year later, on December 6, 2008, French and EU president Nicolas Sarkozy met 
with the Dalai Lama in Gdansk, Poland for 30 minutes. Both were in town for a 25th 
anniversary celebration of the Nobel Prize awarded to Lech Walesa. Sarkozy was the first 
head of state to meet with the Dalai Lama while simultaneously serving as EU 
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 Before the incident, China had warned that a meeting would bring about 
“serious consequences” for Sino-French relations, according to Chinese Deputy Foreign 
Minister He Yafei.
275
 Sarkozy elected to go ahead with the meeting anyway, a decision 
which threatened the relationship between France and China. An article in China claimed 
that “to most Chinese, Mr. Sarkozy is a slimy politician wanting to take advantage of 
China,” and called the Chinese reaction a “gentle snub.”276 Foreign-ministry spokesman 
Liu Jianchao stated, “by meeting with the Dalai Lama, Sarkozy has interfered with 
China’s internal affairs and infringed upon China’s core interests.”277 China demanded 
that France make amends for the infraction and cancelled a Chinese–EU summit that was 
to be held shortly thereafter.
278
 The loss of the summit put in jeopardy $30 billion in trade 
deals that Sarkozy had secured the year before.
279
 In addition, the billion-dollar Airbus 
deal between China and the EU was suspended.
280
 While the rift was ongoing, two trade 
delegations travelled to Europe and signed $15 billion in trade deals with other states.
281
 
There was also a domestic call by an anonymous Internet user for the Chinese to boycott 
Carrefour, a French supermarket.
282
 With the exception of the Airbus contract 
suspension, the economic coercion used here, like in the Merkel case, was more of 
missed opportunities. China was expanding economic cooperation throughout Europe at 
the time and skipping over France, thus imposing an economic cost. Diplomatically, 
Premier Wen Jiabao’s trip to Europe included visits with several neighboring states, but 
he did not stop in France, and as in the Senkaku Islands and Scarborough Shoal incidents, 
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Chinese tourists were discouraged from visiting Paris.
283
 In addition, a French 
governmental website was attacked by Chinese hackers in December.
284
 
In March 2009, French foreign-ministry spokesman Eric Chevallier declared, “we 
are not in favor of independence for Tibet. Our position is entirely unchanged and is one 
of support for the territorial integrity of China and a rejection of secessionist prospects or 
support for the independence of Tibet.”285 This appeared to lessen tensions in the spring, 
but the hopes for reconciliation disappeared following the awarding of an honorary 
citizenship to the Dalai Lama by the city of Paris.
286
 While probably due to a combination 
of the events leading up to and including the Sarkozy-Dalai Lama meeting, a survey of 
Chinese internet users, “netizens,” found that 92 percent thought a high-level meeting 
with the Dalai Lama in the EU would impact their opinion of the EU, and 96 percent 
supported the Chinese-EU summit cancellation.
287
 In November 2009, relations warmed, 
with a trade summit between the two states scheduled.
288
 The same day, a China Daily 
article stated the “France goes back on China’s shopping list.”289 
Sarkozy defended his meeting with the Dalai Lama and stated in a presidential 
address that “I say also in the most tranquil and calm way possible that it is the duty of a 
French president to meet all of the Nobel Peace Prize winners who wish to meet him, 
whatever their origin, whatever their beliefs, whatever the cause they defend.”290 The 
French secretary of state for human rights, Rama Yade, supported the president and urged 
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Sino-French collaboration by describing the 2008 financial downturn as “a period of 
financial crisis we’re going through and we need to cooperate together, calmly.”291 The 
French economic minister did not believe that there would be much reaction to what he 
assumed China would consider a “minor incident” in a statement given the day after the 
meeting.
292
 It appears that France did not expect the negative economic sanctions 
imposed. JeanLuc Domenach, a French academic on China, saw the coming Chinese 
reaction and forecast that “we are likely to suffer somewhat, economically,” but 
downplayed the impact by stating the “Chinese authorities’s rhetoric with regard to 
France is less robust than it was in the spring.”293 In addition, he added that the Chinese 
“are mainly punishing the numerous turnabouts in our policy.”294 In statements by the 
French government and academics, France urged that bilateral relations remain intact, for 
the progress noted earlier to continue. However, the Chinese cancellation of high-level 
meetings and the suspension of the Airbus contract showed that the Chinese government 
was ignoring the plea. 
Europe is not the only region to suffer an injury to relations by meeting with the 
Dalai Lama; recent U.S. meetings have led to strong diplomatic responses from the 
regime. In 2006, the Dalai Lama was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal and the 
action “severely hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.”295 Once President Obama met 
with the Dalai Lama in 2010, Chinese officials immediately stated that the meeting could 
undermine the Sino-U.S. relationship, insinuating that the loss of that relationship could 
hurt economic recovery in the U.S.
296
 While the level of meeting cancellation and 
economic coercion seen in Europe was not applied to the U.S. after these meetings, it 
shows that China feels the need to respond to states whose officials decide to meet with 
the religious leader. 
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E. THE USE OF ECONOMIC COERCION 
Since the downturn of relations in 2005 between the EU and China over the 
textiles quotas and arms embargo, diplomatic relations have remained amicable. The 
meetings between the German and French heads of state and the Dalai Lama were an 
affront to Chinese interests in Tibet and strained these relations, but not relations with the 
EU as a whole. In both cases, economic progress continued, but there was a diplomatic 
freeze. Diplomacy eventually ended both of the incidents, but only after China signaled 
its resolve with economic coercion. In the Merkel case, there was a meeting of foreign 
ministers to restore relations, but in that case, as well as the Sarkozy case, relations only 
improved after both European leaders recognized China’s sovereignty over Tibet. 
China could not signal its resentment with the meetings in Europe militarily, and 
unlike the island disputes, the use of law enforcement would not been effective. China 
already maintains a military and law-enforcement presence in Tibet, and there was little 
incentive to move in more troops, because the European nations would not be directly 
impacted. Nor do China’s forces have the kind of power projection that could reach 
Europe to signal their resolve. 
Economically, the damage done was not irreversible, but mostly to signal China’s 
displeasure. In an empirical study, Fuchs and Klann showed the existence of the “Dalai 
Lama effect.”297 Meetings of high-ranking state officials with the Dalai Lama will have 
an impact on the economic cooperation between China and that state in the short term. 
They found that the higher the official, the more severe the punishment.
298
 In both two 
cases discussed here, the officials were heads of state and the reaction from China lasted 
about six months. China is able to impose these costs because it has a better hold over its 
economy than do more liberal regimes, and because the decrease of imports from the 
targeted state could decline as much as 16.9 percent in the two years following the 
meeting.
299
 In addition, while the cancellation of summits seems as though it may have 
little effect, these meetings can increase bilateral trade by 8–10 percent, thus making 
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cancellation a form of economic sanction.
300
 The suspension of the Airbus contract was a 
more outright expression of displeasure. Fuchs and Klann found that China was more 
willing to bear the economic and political costs to ensure that China remained whole, 
thus supporting regime survival (H3).
301
 Merkel and Sarkozy, on the other hand, operate 
in democracies in which economic coercion can have more effect than in China, as 
pointed out by Ravindran’s study.302 The cancellation of meetings, suspension of the 
Airbus contract, and the snubbing of both governments during European visits support 
the first hypothesis (H1), that China will use economic coercion to signal its resolve 
when it perceives that a state is challenging its territorial integrity. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The meetings between the Dalai Lama and world leaders caused China to use 
economic coercion, whether outright, as in the Airbus contract suspension, or implied, as 
in the cancellation of high-level summits. The EU emphasis on human rights and 
democracy versus China’s emphasis on economic growth and sovereignty are clear 
philosophical differences separating the parties. This separation led to a downturn in 
diplomatic relations in 2005, with the continuation of the arms embargo to China and the 
Olympic protests in 2008. Economically, however, the relationship continued to improve 
despite the textile dispute in 2005 and controversy over the increasing trade deficit with 
China. Trade between the two states has improved since 2003, and China has become the 
second-most-important trading partner for the EU, and the EU the first for China.  
The use of economic coercion through the Dalai Lama effect, and suspension of 
the airbus contract, supports the following hypotheses: H1, territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; H2, the status quo; and if extrapolated, H3, regime legitimacy Engagement 
of the “Dalai Lama clique” by heads of state have been found to incite economic coercion 
from China, mostly to signal resolve through the Dalai Lama effect, which can reduce a 
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state’s exports to China as much as 16.9 percent over the two years after the meeting.303 
H5, economic asymmetry, and H4, nationalism, are not supported. As pointed out earlier, 
China holds 10 percent of the goods trade done by the EU, while the EU holds 18 percent 
of China’s goods trade.304 Despite the trade deficit, the discontinuation of trade could 
adversely impact the Chinese economy as much, if not more, than the EU, thus making 
economic asymmetry (H5) not a likely condition of the use of economic coercion. In 
addition, while there was one cyber-attack on a French website, nationalist sentiment in 
China did not appear to have much impact on policy makers, showing little support for 
H4. There were no protests and only a short-lived boycott of a French supermarket. China 
clearly sees meetings between the Dalai Lama and foreign heads of state as a challenge to 
its interests and uses economic coercion in an attempt to shape the behavior of another 
international player.305 
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V. ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES AND MINI-CASES 
The final chapter and conclusion, Chapter V is intended to compare the case 
studies in the hopes of identifying one or several triggers which make the use of Chinese 
economic coercion more likely. The selected hypotheses are then tested against mini-case 
studies and the implications of the study results are discussed. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
David Baldwin states that the purpose of economic coercion is to constrain the 
actions of an opposing international actor through negative economic sanctions.
306
 In the 
cases reviewed in this thesis, China engaged in economic coercion to shape Japanese and 
the Philippine behavior in territorial disputes and to prevent heads of state from meeting 
with the Dalai Lama. In the territorial dispute cases, the use of economic coercion was 
more outright than in the Dalai Lama case study. Each case, however, included the use of 
economic coercion to signal China’s displeasure with the opposing state’s actions, during 
the current conflict and to shape future action. 
These selected studies highlight the circumstances under which China will use 
economic coercion and other steps to secure its interests. In the Senkakus and 
Scarborough case studies, China employed similar economic tactics, such as cancelling 
high-level meetings, restricting tourism, and targeting a sector in which it had an 
asymmetric advantage for sanctions or inspections. The cancellation of high-level 
meetings had to dual impact of punishing the targeted state through lost trade and 
signaling displeasure through political channels. To back its signal of resolve with 
economic coercion, in both cases China increased patrols of law-enforcement vessels to 
physically protect Chinese fishermen and property, and to increase China’s control over 
the disputed territories. In the Dalai Lama cases, increasing the presence of law 
enforcement in Tibet was not required, since there was no disputed territory and China 
controlled it outright, but the type of economic coercion was similar. China cancelled 
meetings, decreased tourism, increased rhetoric, and, for the Sarkozy meeting, suspended 
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a $30 billion Airbus contract. The case studies show that China will use economic 
coercion when it perceives that its territorial integrity and sovereignty or the status quo of 
territories are being challenged. Economic asymmetry is a necessary condition for the 
targeting of a specific sector, but not a trigger of coercion. The hypotheses presented in 
this research and the evidence contained in all three case studies are reviewed below and 
the conclusion as to the validity of the hypothesis is applied to recent examples to 
discover whether the findings of the research have any explanatory power. Finally, 
implications for U.S. policy and the U.S. Navy will be discussed before finalization of the 
argument. 
B. PRESENTATION OF HYPOTHESES 
In this research, two hypotheses were supported across all three cases for the use 
of economic coercion by China: H1, when a challenge to territorial integrity and 
sovereignty is perceived, and H2, challenges to the status quo are perceived. Challenges 
to CCP legitimacy (H3) and presence of economic asymmetry (H5) are only partially 
supported by the cases and nationalism as a driver of economic coercion (H4) is not 
supported. 
1. H1: Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty 
As shown in the case studies, China does use economic coercion in territorial 
disputes with other states. Both the Senkaku Island and Scarborough Shoal case studies 
indicate that a way for China to signal its resolve in these disputes without using military 
force is economic coercion. In the Senkakus case, China cancelled bilateral meetings, 
suspended talks on joint energy exploration, and decreased tourism to Japan. China also 
leveraged REE at a time when it provided 80–90 percent of Japan’s REE imports307 and 
sent law-enforcement vessels to protect its interests.  
With Japanese dependence on China for the much-needed raw material, it left 
Japan vulnerable to China manipulating the supply. In the two months following the 
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arrest of the captain and crew of the Minjinyu 5179, exports of REE fell drastically, 
signaling Chinese displeasure with the infringement of Chinese territory.  
China also used economic coercion in the Scarborough Shoal dispute, again 
cancelling meetings, reducing tourism, and manipulating an economic sector, in this case, 
the fruit trade.
308
 China restricted banana imports from the Philippines with the 
explanation that it was being done so to prevent the inflow of foreign organisms. This 
economic coercion was able to target the banana industry on Mindanao and bring 
domestic pressure on President Aquino to back down. As a storm passed a few months 
into the standoff, the Philippines and China withdrew their coast guards, with only China 
returning a few days later to claim de facto control over the shoal. In both cases of 
territorial dispute, China used a combination of economic coercion and law enforcement 
vessels solidify its interests. 
The third case study examines China’s response to Dalai Lama visits with heads 
of state in Europe. While Tibet is not a disputed territory between two recognized states, 
it is the subject of an internal conflict between the PRC and a people whom they believe 
are separatists. As the Dalai Lama calls for a more meaningful autonomy, China believes 
his real agenda is to push for an independent Tibetan state. Therefore, reception of the 
Dalai Lama by other heads of state is perceived as supporting the exiled government. 
China responded to a perceived challenge to its territorial sovereignty and integrity with 
the “Dalai Lama effect,” in which it is shown that trade between China and a targeted 
state decreases by as much as 16.9 percent over the two years following a meeting.
309
 
China also cancelled high-level meetings, withdraw from conversations on the 
environment, and, in France, boycotted a summit, targeted tourism, and suspended a $30 
billion Airbus deal. Diplomatically, both these cases subsided following repeated 
statements by the German and French governments recognizing China’s sovereignty over 
Tibet. China’s heavy-handed snubbing and outright suspension of lucrative contracts 
effectively indicated China’s displeasure with the offending heads of state and warned 
others not to interfere in like manner. 
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2. H2: The Status Quo 
The status quo defended by China is made up of bilateral agreements and alleged 
formal and informal deals with other states. The case studies support an assertion that 
changes to the status quo will cause China to use economic coercion. China’s policy on 
territorial disputes is, as Deng Xiaoping stated, to “set aside dispute and pursue joint 
development.”310 China is not ignoring issues of sovereignty under this policy, just 
delaying disputation until a later time. With this in mind, the actions of a foreign power 
attempting to change current conditions is perceived in China as an affront to its interests. 
In the Senkakus dispute, although the islands are administered by Japan, the arrest and 
charging of Zhan Qixiong violated the 1997 China–Japan Fisheries Agreement and a 
supposed secret deal between China and the LDP. Unfortunately, the DPJ officials in 
power did not know about this arrangement. Previously, any vessel and crew that was 
detained was released in short order, and any charges were filed by the state under which 
the vessels were flagged. The arrest and charging of Zhan violated this arrangement. As a 
result, China responded with law enforcement vessels and economic coercion, most 
notably the suspension of REE shipments. During the Scarborough Shoal incident, 
Chinese interests were offended due to an attempted search and seizure by a Philippine 
warship. This appeared to be an escalation from the DOC terms and therefore elicited a 
PRC response of economic and law-enforcement coercion to protect Chinese interests in 
the region—which it now controls. 
Tibet lends a different perspective on the importance of the status quo in disputed 
territories. China legitimates its hegemony according to the Seventeen-Point Agreement, 
which made Tibet an autonomous region of China. Since then, China has administered 
the Tibetan region and views reception of the Dalai Lama by foreign heads of state as 
hostile to its interests. International support for the Dalai Lama as the leader of an 
independent Tibet would change the status quo significantly and possibly trigger the loss 
of the Xinjiang region and Inner Mongolia. China sees meetings with the Dalai Lama as a 
challenge to a settled right to rule Tibet, and responds with sticks. 
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3. H3: Regime Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of the CCP was not questioned in the maritime disputes of the 
Senkaku Islands and Scarborough Shoal. While Japan and the Philippines did challenge 
China’s interests, they did not attack the CCP’s right to rule China. In Tibet, however, the 
loss of Tibet could set off a chain reaction in which China might lose a large part of its 
territory to separatists. This blow would challenge the legitimacy of the CCP, which 
would descend from being the party of economic prosperity to the party that allowed 
foreigners to carve up China again. That said, the prospect of the CCP’s toppling is more 
than a few steps removed from receiving the Dalai Lama as a respected international 
figure, and many more events would have to occur before China lost Tibet, let alone 
Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. This being so, it is likely that since the Dalai Lama case is 
the only instance where a challenge to the CCP’s legitimacy could be involved, H3 is not 
supported by the evidence and another hypothesis is more likely. 
4. H4: Chinese Nationalism 
In each of the case studies, Chinese citizens protested, boycotted, or wrote 
editorials to denounce foreign actions, but the nationalist outbursts were more prevalent 
in the Senkaku Island case study than the others. Although nationalist outcries were seen, 
the evidence does not support the hypothesis that these protests influenced Chinese 
decision making. The Senkaku Island dispute aroused the most public reaction; in the 
Scarborough Shoal case, there were small protests and a few cyber-attacks; but in both 
cases, the steps China took to signal resolve were very similar. China responded as if 
operating out of a playbook: applying economic coercion by targeting a resource on 
which it had an asymmetrical advantage, suspending travel, and canceling meetings. The 
difference was a matter of detail: the suspension of an export versus increased inspections 
on an import. Nationalism in the Senkakus case may have played a role in China’s 
decision to ban REE over a longer period of time, past when they achieve a better law 
enforcement presence around the Senkaku Islands and the release of Zhan. 
In the Dalai Lama case, hypothesis H4 also remains unsupported. Nationalistic 
fervor mostly consisted of a call to boycott a French supermarket chain and one cyber-
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attack. There was little pressure from the general population to strike at Germany or 
France, although the EU’s favorable reputation did decrease. Comparing the Senkakus 
and Scarborough case studies and factoring in the lack of outcry over the Dalai Lama 
meetings, the case studies do not support nationalism as a restrictor in Chinese foreign 
policy. 
5. H5: Asymmetric Trade Advantage 
While China’s economic coercion depends on an asymmetric relationship with the 
target, that relationship is not a trigger per se. In the Senkakus and Scarborough cases, 
China targeted sectors in which it could impose costs without absorbing many costs itself. 
With respect to Senkakus, China had a near monopoly on the REE sector and could 
manipulate the supply as it pleased. In the Scarborough case, China chose an industry in 
which it is a major importer, and thus important to the target state, but—owing to 
asymmetry–of negligible importance to the Chinese. In both cases, the suspension of 
trade could be sustained by the instigator. China uses economic coercion in retaliation; 
asymmetry in economic trade is an important part of that, but not sufficient to trigger 
coercive action. As shown in the discussion of the Dalai Lama, China is willing to use 
sticks even when approximately matched in economic strength. An asymmetrical 
relationship does have an important part in the explanatory power of results. China’s near 
monopoly or overwhelming share of trade in a sector increases an opposing state’s 
vulnerability to coercion. 
C. APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESES IN RECENT DISPUTES 
The explanatory power of the findings centers on under what conditions it can be 
predicted that China will be more likely to use economic coercion. The confirmed 
hypotheses should predict which sectors are vulnerable to economic coercion and what 
will trigger an action. In cases where the targeted state is dependent on China, more 
stringent actions might be taken to signal resolve. To expand on the major studies in this 
research, three recent examples are presented below to help ascertain whether the 
findings hold true and Chinese actions are in line with predictive models. 
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1. The 2012 Senkakus Dispute 
On September 10, 2012, Japan announced that it would purchase the Senkaku 
Islands from their private owner.
311
 The announcement renewed the territorial dispute, 
which had lain dormant two years, since the arrest of Zhan Qixiong. Prime Minister 
Yoshihikoda Noda stated that the purchase was intended to reduce tensions in the 
maritime dispute, not to incite China.
312
 In response, the CFM issued a statement that 
characterized the move as a “severe infringement of Chinese territorial sovereignty, 
which gravely hurts the feelings of the 1.3 billion Chinese people.”313 In a later statement, 
vice foreign minister Zhang Zhijun stated that “Japan has no right to buy or sell Chinese 
territory in any way and no transaction is allowed over even one inch of the Diaoyu 
[Senkaku] Islands.”314 Zhang also linked the sale directly to an infringement on China’s 
territorial sovereignty.
315
 Domestically, the Chinese population responded with mass 
protests. On September 15
th
, Japanese businesses and property were damaged. On 
September 18
th
, the anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the protests 
spread, causing more damage to Japanese interests.
316
 From the Chinese perspective, the 
selling of the islands, regardless of the intention of the Japanese state, challenged their 
claim and thus China’s territorial integrity. 
From the previous row over the Senkaku Islands, it might be expected that China 
would counter this affront by economic coercion and increased maritime patrols. The 
previous case would predict that China would find an asymmetrical relationship with 
Japan and reduce imports or exports accordingly. As noted, Japan’s reliance on China for 
REE decreased after the 2010 territorial dispute, leaving China with fewer options for 
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negative economic statecraft. No embargo was put into effect, but Japan did notice a dip 
in car sales in China, as documented by Dong Yang of the China Association of 
Automobile Manufacturers and Toshiyuki Shiga of Nissan.
317
 While this did not imply a 
state response to the challenge, it did show that Chinese consumers are responsive to 
Japanese actions. Consumer boycotts were common in the cases studied, but they were of 
minimal importance next to state actions. In this instance, it appears that the state did not 
resort to economic coercion, but the population may have. In addition, China increased its 
law-enforcement patrols in the area. 
2. Second Thomas Shoal 
In the Spratly Islands, 105 nautical miles west of the Philippines, an old rusted 
WWII-era landing transport ship, BRP Sierra Madre, has been grounded with a rotating 
crew from the Philippine military since 1999. China recently established a presence 
around the vessel and is attempting to block the Philippines from resupplying the marines 
or swapping the crew. Liu Zhemin states that “China has sovereignty over the Nansha 
[Spratly] Islands and adjacent waters, nor will it shake the Chinese government's will and 
resolution to safeguard territorial sovereignty, maritime rights, and interests.”318 Chinese 
air force major-general Zhang Zhaozhong advocated that China take on a “cabbage 
strategy,” in which the PLAN would surround the area further out and Chinese coast-
guard vessels would patrol closer in.
319
 China has characterized the presence of the vessel 
and its crew as contrary to the DOC and maintains that it has sovereignty over the 
shoal.
320
 Also asserting ownership of the shoal, the Philippines recently updated a claim 
sent to the UN Arbitral Tribunal under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to 
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include it, further straining relations between the two states.
321 
Wu Schicun, president of 
the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, called the filing of the complaint “an 
abuse of law procedures.”322 
Based on the case studies and hypotheses above, China would be expected to 
respond to the Philippine claim submission and presence on the shoal. However, the 
initial provocation—the grounding of the ship—occurred in 1999, when China lacked the 
maritime capability it wields now. The status quo for the past 15 years has been 
occupation of the ship by the marines; the Philippines have not built additional structures 
on the shoal. For economic coercion to be effective, action should have been taken in 
1999 to prevent the Philippines from establishing a presence. This research found no 
evidence that sticks were used at the time. However, China was not the economic 
juggernaut it is today and held less weight in the Philippine economy. In 2002, three 
years after the grounding, China was merely the ninth-largest trading partner with the 
Philippines
323
 and may not have had enough economic advantage to attempt coercion. 
China was also nearing the finalization of 15 years of negotiation to join the World Trade 
Organization, which may have limited its desire to use economic coercion. Instead, China 
used the second tactic found in the case studies, the deployment of law-enforcement 
vessels. China maintains a constant presence by the shoal and attempts to interdict the 
resupplying of the marines to starve them off.
324
 China responds with the use of law 
enforcement vessels to protect its interests, which was seen in both the territorial dispute 
case studies. The building of additional structures on the shoal, would be a further 
provocation and may elicit economic coercion from China. With economic coercion not 
expected due to the upholding of the status quo in this dispute, the findings did rightly 
predict that China would attempt to enforce its claim through coast-guard ships. 
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3. The President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron Meeting with the 
Dalai Lama 
President Barack Obama had his third meeting with the 14th Dalai Lama on 
February 21, 2014. Like his first two meetings, it was protested by the PRC, with the 
usual denunciations of U.S. interference in Chinese domestic matters.
325
 China 
emphasized cooperation with the U.S., but noted that meeting with the Dalai Lama could 
undermine the relationship. Deng Yushan, a Xinhua staff writer, stated that “it is common 
sense that slamming on the brakes of a fast-moving car might result in unpredictable 
consequences” and urged the U.S. to respect its relationship with China.326 CFM 
spokesperson Qin Gang touted Chinese economic progress, including a higher standard 
of living and the abolition of serfdom, as “facts that won't be denied by anyone without 
political bias,” drawing attention to the positive aspects of Chinese rule without 
broaching Western concerns over human rights. Obama, meanwhile, endorsed the Dalai 
Lama’s middle-way approach, stating that he is not challenging China’s territorial 
integrity.
327
 While Obama endorsed the middle way, China denounced it, stating that it 
ran counter to “history and reality.”328 Despite Chinese rhetoric, Obama proceeded with 
the meeting, disregarding the threatened potential economic impacts, which did not 
occur. 
Prime Minister David Cameron met with the Dalai Lama on May 14, 2012, in the 
face of Chinese protests. A British spokesman held that “it is for the prime minister and 
deputy prime minister to choose who they see. The Dalai Lama is an important religious 
figure and advocate for peace and the prime minister regularly meets with such 
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figures.”329 China, on the other hand, stated that the meeting interfered with its domestic 
affairs and affronted the Chinese people.
330
 CFM spokesman Hong Lei stated that the 
British “grossly interfered in China's internal affairs, hurt the feelings of Chinese 
people.”331 Notably, Cameron’s meeting with the Dalai Lama did not provoke as much 
Chinese media attention as Obama’s. Nevertheless, the meeting was seen as a challenge 
to Chinese interests by its implied support for Tibetan separatism. 
The previous case studies encourage the assumption that China would cancel 
high-level meetings, suspend contracts, and possibly issue travel warnings in the wake of 
the Dalai Lama visits. Despite the uproar, however, there appears to be little movement 
toward economic targeting of the U.S. This hesitation could be due to America’s standing 
as the number-one trading partner of China or and attempts to realize a new great power 
relationship. In England, high-level meetings were cancelled, including a visit while on 
European tour by Wu Bangguo, chairman of the standing committee of the National 
People’s Congress.332 At the same time, British officials in Beijing discovered that their 
meetings were cancelled or reduced to lower levels.
333
 Despite these shows of disrespect, 
China did not suspend travel or economic trade with England. 
D. FUTURE LIKELIHOOD OF CHINESE ECONOMIC COERCION 
China’s rise in relative economic and military power in the international system 
will set the conditions necessary for an increase in the use of economic coercion, but it 
may also limit its usage as well. Economically, as China continues to progress and take a 
larger share of international trade, more states will become dependent on China for their 
economic survival. This dependency translates to more sectors vulnerable to economic 
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coercion, and thus, more options for China to signal its resolve and desires through. 
China’s ability to influence the internal decision-making processes of other states will 
increase. While a greater ability to use economic coercion could lead to an increase in 
cases, it could also decrease its use for two reasons. First, states with large trade 
dependency on China may begin to make decisions with China’s interests in mind, thus 
imposing a type of self-imposed behavior modification which would benefit China. This 
would lead to the number of challenges in which China would feel the need to respond 
with economic coercion decreasing. Second, as China’s economic sway over states 
increases, its ability to shape state behavior without the actual use of economic coercion, 
just the threat of it may influence a state. Although China’s economic ability to use 
coercion may increase, its willingness and necessity to do so may not. 
Similarly, China’s rise in military power may reduce its use of economic 
statecraft. The military modernization program improves China’s might and improves its 
standing as a regional power. As a result, states within the region and under threat of 
China’s military will be less likely to challenge Chinese interests. Fear of Chinese 
military retribution will increase and shape the behavior of states before incidents occur. 
The military also adds an additional tool for China to use to signal its resolve in disputes, 
thus lowering the likelihood of economic coercion. On the other hand, as China’s military 
remains a regional and not global power, states outside of the region may continue to face 
economic coercion. For states within Asia, as China’s military might grows will reduce 
the likelihood of economic coercion, while more far-flung states may still see it as a tactic 
until military modernization makes projection of power more likely. 
The increasing number of democracies makes the use of economic coercion more 
likely globally, not only from China. Democracies are more vulnerable to economic 
coercion from its ability to increase domestic pressure on regimes through the imposition 
of costs on the population. Democracies will continue to be a likely target of economic 
coercion because of this susceptibility. States such as Vietnam remain insulated to 
economic coercion, while Japan and the Philippines are not, based solely on regime type. 
This translates to China’s use of economic coercion more likely to be utilized against 
democracies due to its ability to pressure regimes from within. 
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China’s rise may increase its ability to use economic coercion, the combination of 
an additional tool, the military, and the a reduction in the need for it may cause a drop in 
the likelihood of Chinese economic coercion. When used, China is likely to target 
democracies outside of the reach of China’s military to shape state behavior through the 
use of economic coercion. 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. AND U.S. NAVY 
The case studies selected have economic and security implications for the U.S. 
and its interests in the Asian–Pacific region. First, China not only uses economic coercion 
to defend its territory and the status quo, but may also resort to law enforcement to 
improve its position. The vulnerability of U.S. economic sectors to Chinese coercion is 
troublesome. The targeting of specific sectors was carried out where China held an 
advantage. Where China’s advantage was less pronounced, it engaged in economic 
coercion, but did not target a sector. The Obama administration has had three meetings 
with the Dalai Lama and has thus far avoided the measures that were used against France 
and Germany. As China becomes more powerful economically, it may exploit the 
vulnerability of U.S. industrial sectors when it perceives challenges. To avoid being 
targeted, all sectors should diversify as to suppliers and markets. If China makes up only 
a small portion of a larger marketplace, it will have difficulty retaliating through the 
sector involved; on the other hand, if China is relied upon for the preponderance of a raw 
material or necessary good, the state is vulnerable to economic coercion. Economic 
diversity is the first step towards limiting PRC control over American markets and 
resources. 
From a security perspective, it is significant to note that the U.S. has treaty 
obligations with the targeted states studied. One of the PRC’s responses to maritime 
challenges is to increase law-enforcement patrols in disputed areas. This presence 
protects Chinese interests, but also increases tensions and the risk of an aggravating 
incident that will precipitate U.S. involvement based on treaty obligations. In Japan, the 
1951 San Francisco Treaty and the 1972 Agreement between Japan and the United States 
of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands delineate that the U.S. 
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is obligated to aid Japan in the event of attack, and this obligation covers the Senkaku 
Islands. The current administration has affirmed its commitment to the treaty, with 
President Obama in 2014 and Secretary of State Clinton in 2010 making reference to the 
islands as included in the agreement.
334
 In the Philippines, the U.S. relationship is 
governed by the mutual-defense treaty between the Republic of the Philippines and the 
United States of America. The U.S. has not clarified whether it considers Scarborough 
Shoal to be covered and it is unclear whether the U.S. would aid the Philippines if it were 
defending its rights there. Secretary Clinton stated that the U.S. would remain neutral in 
the dispute between China and the Philippines, but hoped it can be resolved peacefully.
335
 
Treaty commitments could expose the U.S. to large conflicts over the rights to eight small 
islands or five rocks. The U.S. should use caution to avoid a conflict where it has little at 
stake. 
To mitigate the security risk the territory disputes pose, the U.S. has three policy 
options: abandon allies, stay neutral, or stand with allies, but only the latter are feasible. 
The abandonment of treaty allies would send a signal throughout Asia that the U.S. 
cannot be trusted and would push many states toward alliance with China. This would be 
inimical to U.S. interests in balancing other states against China, and thus it would be off 
the table. The U.S. currently maintains indifference in the ultimate resolution of 
sovereignty in the territorial disputes. A neutral stance toward disputants is likely the only 
policy that will incur neither China’s wrath nor an ally’s disapproval. In the cases 
researched, to back up treaty allies more definitively and formally to side with Japan or 
the Philippines would likely be seen as a violation of the status quo and thus encourage 
China to increase patrols and target the U.S. It is preferable that the U.S. encourage third-
party mediation of territorial disputes and continue to attract regional allies to balance 
China’s growth. A formal crisis-resolution framework should be worked out to mitigate 
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the risk of incidents that provoke military action on either side. The U.S. Navy should 
continue its forward presence in Asia to retain the confidence of treaty allies and deter 
Chinese escalations. 
F. SUMMARY AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
While the cases presented are not inclusive of the few alleged incidents of 
economic coercion, the results suggest that China uses economic coercion to defend its 
territorial interests while also pursuing its stated foreign policy of putting disputes aside 
to focus on cooperation and economic growth. Further research into the topic could yield 
a more exhaustive list of alleged instances of coercion to test the hypotheses affirmed. 
Since one of the drivers of coercion is also a core Chinese interest—that is, territorial 
integrity and sovereignty—additional research might look at other core interests to see if 
they have likewise been defended through economic coercion.  
The researcher’s hypotheses were further tested in four comparatively minor 
examples of territorial challenges or violations of the status quo, and were confirmed 
consistent with China’s historical response to violations—cancellations, travel warnings, 
rhetoric, and, if advantageous, sanctions. The U.S., thus far has not been a target of 
economic coercion due to meetings with the Dalai Lama, but as China’s economic 
strength rises, U.S. economic sectors could become more vulnerable. In addition, as a 
supplementary response China uses law enforcement vessels to physically defend its 
territorial interests. From a security perspective, increased patrols in disputed waters 
increases the likelihood of a maritime incident happening between states, possibly with 
states that are treaty allies with the U.S. In the future, with China’s responses being 
seemingly standardized, it is reasonable to expect that further challenges or escalations 
would elicit similar responses. Depending on the state’s dependencies, economic 
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